Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers by Zirkel, Perry A.
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 2
12-15-2018
Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues
and Answers
Perry A. Zirkel
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the Education Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Perry A. Zirkel, Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers, 38 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 32 (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol38/iss2/2
   
 
Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and 
Answers 
By Perry A. Zirkel* 
        I.     HEARING OFFICER ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 34 
A. IHO Qualifications ............................................................................................................ 34 
B.  IHO Immunity .................................................................................................................... 36 
 II. HEARING/DECISION ISSUES ......................................................................................................... 37 
A. Resolution Sessions ........................................................................................................... 37 
B. Sufficiency Process ............................................................................................................ 43 
C. Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................ 45 
D. Timelines in General  ........................................................................................................ 58 
E. Expedited Hearings ........................................................................................................... 62 
F. Prehearing and Hearing Procedures, Including Evidentiary Matters ............................. 65 
G. Decisional Issues  .............................................................................................................. 85 
H. Written Decisions  ............................................................................................................. 88 




















    
Fall 2018       Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers 33 
This updated question-and-answer document is specific to 
impartial hearing officers (IHOs) and the hearings that they conduct 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1  The 
coverage does not extend to the alternate third-party dispute 
decisional mechanism under the IDEA, the complaint resolution 
process (CRP) except to the extent that this alternative mechanism 
intersects with IHO issues.2  Similarly, the scope only extends 
secondarily to the IHO’s remedial authority, which is the subject of 
separate comprehensive coverage.3  The sources are largely limited to 
the pertinent IDEA legislation and regulations, court decisions, and 
the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education’s 
(OSEP) policy letters.4  Thus, the answers are subject to revision or 
                                                          
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor emeritus of education and law at 
Lehigh University.  He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the 
University of Connecticut, and an L.L.M. from Yale.  Although remaining solely 
responsible for the contents, the author expresses his appreciation to editor-in-chief 
Yoori Chung for her diligent work in assuring the stylistic compliance of the article 
with the applicable manuals. 
1 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400.1 et seq. 
(2017).  For the IDEA regulations, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) Assistance to States for the 
Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 (2018). 
2 For a legal overview of CRP, see Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the 
IDEA Complaint Resolution Process: An Update, 313 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2015).  For 
a systematic comparison of the two mechanisms, see Perry A. Zirkel, A 
Comparison of the IDEA’s Dispute Resolution Processes: Complaint Resolution 
and Impartial Hearings, 326 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2016).  For the primary features of 
the state CRP systems, see Kristin Hansen & Perry A. Zirkel, Complaint Procedure 
Systems under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 31 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 
LEADERSHIP 108 (Sept. 2018). 
3 Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Latest Update, 37 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 505 (2018); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition 
and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A Decisional Checklist, 282 EDUC. L 
REP. 785 (2012); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: The Next Annotated 
Update of the Law, 336 EDUC. L. REP. 654 (2016). 
4 OSEP is the specific organizational unit within the U.S. Department of 
Education that administers the IDEA.  Although OSEP policy letters do not have 
the binding effect on IHOs of either the IDEA or, within their jurisdictions, court 
decisions, they provide a nationally applicable interpretation that courts often find 
persuasive.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Courts’ Use of OSEP Policy 
Interpretations in IDEA Cases, 344 EDUC. L. REP. 671 (2017).  But cf. Seth B. v. 
Orleans Parish Sch. Dist., 810 F.3d 961, 968 (5th Cir. 2015) (relying on the 
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qualification based on (1) applicable state laws;5 (2) additional legal 
sources beyond those cited; and (3) independent interpretation of the 
cited and additional pertinent legal sources.   The author welcomes 
corrections and additions from interested parties so that the document 
is as accurate, comprehensive, and current as possible.  
Intended primarily for IHOs but ultimately for any interested 
individuals, the items are organized into various subject categories 
within two successive broad groups.  For the specific organization, 
see the Table of Contents on the previous page.   
 
I.  HEARING OFFICER ISSUES 
 
A.  IHO Qualifications  
 
1. Does the IDEA provide any standards for IHO competence? 
 
Yes, the 2004 amendments provided, for the first time, 
competence standards, which are broadly focused on knowing special 
education law, conducting hearings, and writing decisions.6  
Specifically, the IDEA competency standards require IHOs to:   
 
(1) possess knowledge of, and the ability to 
understand, the provisions of [the IDEA], Federal and 
State regulations pertaining to [the IDEA], and legal 
interpretations of [the IDEA] by Federal and State 
courts; (2) possess the knowledge and ability to 
conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate, 
standard legal practice; and (3) possess the knowledge 
and ability to render and write decisions in accordance 
with appropriate, standard legal practice.7  
                                                          
relevant regulation rather than the “questionable” OSEP interpretation). The 
citations for policy letters herein include the parallel ed.gov URLs when available 
for improved accessibility to the reader. 
5 For a systematic overview, see Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process 
Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 3 (2018). 
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A).   
7 Id.  In the few pertinent cases prior to these statutory standards, the courts 
rejected challenges to IHO competency because they were not beyond the scope of 
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2. Similarly, does the IDEA provide specific training requirements 
for IHOs that are enforceable in individual cases? 
 
No, training requirements are a matter of state law.8  Thus far, the 
courts have not interpreted these state law provisions as incorporated 
in the IDEA.9 
 
3. What about the IDEA’s impartiality requirements? 
 
In contrast to competence and training, IHO impartiality has been 
the subject of extensive litigation.  Courts have been notably 
deferential, providing wide latitude to IHOs and generally not 
requiring the appearance of impropriety standard that applies to 
judges.10  The leading, but still not per se, exception for such 
                                                          
the IDEA.  E.g., Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (D. Md. 2000); 
Cavanagh v. Grasmick, 75 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (D. Md. 1999).  After enactment 
of this standard, the case law has been very limited and rather deferential.  E.g., 
Bohn ex rel. Cook v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 8 (N.D. Iowa 
2016). 
8 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  In the 
commentary accompanying the 2006 IDEA regulations, OSEP added that each 
SEA’s general supervisory responsibility includes ensuring that its IHOs are 
sufficiently trained to meet the three newly specified qualifications. Assistance to 
States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for 
Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,705 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  For state laws that specify training requirements for 
IHOs, see Zirkel, supra note 5, at 17. 
9 E.g., C.S. ex rel. Struble v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 63 (S.D. Cal. 
2008); Adams v. Sch. Bd. of Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 38 IDELR 
¶ 6 (D. Minn. 2002); Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Carnwath v. 
Bd. of Educ., 33 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (D. Md. 1998); cf. D.A. ex rel. Adams v. 
Fairfield-Suisun Unified Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 105 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (SEA is not 
responsible in California for IHO training and competence); Canton Bd. of Educ. v. 
N.B., 343 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. Conn. 2004) (lack of systemic violation).  But 
cf. C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(applying “grandfathered” state law criteria in upholding competence of IHO). 
10 E.g., Peter Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review 
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Checklist of Legal 
Boundaries, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109, 120 n.62 (2007); Elaine Drager & Perry 
A. Zirkel, Impartiality under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 86 
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deference, is for ex parte communications.11  The overlapping issue 
of recusal is largely a matter of state law,12 although an occasional 
court decision has identified applicable criteria or procedures for 
appellate review.13 
 
4. Would a school district’s notification to the IHO that final 
selection is contingent on the parent’s approval violate the IDEA? 
 
Not according to OSEP’s interpretation, because the IDEA does 
not provide parents with a veto right in the appointment of IHOs.14  
However, this interpretation does not seem to take into careful 
consideration that only a few state laws provide for party 
participation in the selection process.15 
 
B.  IHO Immunity 
 
5. Do IHOs have the same sweeping, absolute immunity that judges 
have? 
 
Yes, within the scope of their authority as IHOs.16 
                                                          
EDUC. L. REP. 11, 12–13 (1994). For state laws that provide additional IHO 
impartiality requirements, including the higher standard, see Zirkel, supra note 5, at 
17. 
11 E.g., Hollenbeck v. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 658, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1988).  
But cf. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 93 v. John F. ex rel. James F., 33 IDELR ¶ 
210 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (based on proof of lack of actual bias, rejected ex parte 
challenge).  
12 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (within subcategories of IHO 
qualifications and assignment and Party right to strike),  
13 E.g., Falmouth Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. 
Mass. 2000). 
14 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996). 
15 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 19–20.  The approach in these few states is 
more limited than mutual selection.  E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-
8.02a(f)(5) (2018) (permitting each party the right to one substitution in the 
rotational assignment of the IHO). 
16 E.g., Singletary v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 848 F. Supp. 2d 588, 
593 (E.D. N.C. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 502 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Luo v. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d on 
other grounds, 556 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2013); Oskowis v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., 72 
IDELR ¶ 216 (D. Ariz. 2018); Henry ex rel. M.H. v. Lane, 69 IDELR ¶ 277 (W.D. 
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II. HEARING/DECISION ISSUES 
 
A. Resolution Sessions 
 
6. Does the resolution process (in 34 C.F.R. § 300.510) apply when a 
local education agency (LEA) files a due process complaint? 
 
No, OSEP has explained that this process is not required in such 
cases.17   Rather, the forty-five-day period starts when the state 
education agency (SEA) and the parent receive the school district’s 
complaint.18   According to OSEP, the parent’s right to a sufficiency 
challenge and obligation to respond to the district’s complaint are the 
same as for the district in the reverse situation.19  For cases in which 
the parent raises a sufficiency challenge, OSEP added: “one way for 
an LEA to amend a due process complaint that is not sufficient is for 
the parent to agree in writing and be given an opportunity to resolve 
the LEA's due process complaint through a resolution meeting.”20 
 
7. Are the discussions in resolution sessions confidential? 
 
According to OSEP’s interpretation, the only confidentiality 
provisions that apply are the student records provisions in 34 C.F.R. 
                                                          
Pa. 2017); T.O. ex rel. Hayes v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 182 
(E.D.N.C. 2017), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F. App’x. 640 (4th Cir. 2017); Luo v. 
Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016); B.J.S. v. State Educ. 
Dep’t, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (W.D.N.Y 2010); Stassart v. Lakeside Joint Sch. 
Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 51 (N.D. Cal. 2009); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. 
Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 253 (E.D. Cal. 2008); DeMerchant v. Springfield Sch. Dist., 47 
IDELR ¶ 94 (D. Vt. 2007); Weyrick v. New Albany-Floyd Cty. Consol. Sch. Corp., 
42 IDELR ¶ 169 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Sand v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 46 IDELR ¶ 161 
(E.D. Wis. 2006); Walled Lake Consol. Sch. v. Doe, 42 IDELR ¶ 3 (E.D. Mich. 
2004); cf. M.O. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851–54 (N.D. Ind. 
2009) (IDEA review officers). 
17 Dispute Resolution Procedures Under Part B of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 61 IDELR ¶ 232, at item D-2 (OSEP 2013) [hereinafter 
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§ 300.610 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA).21    Absent a voluntary agreement between the parties for 
confidentiality, OSEP’s position is that either party may introduce 
evidence of these discussions at the hearing.22  Although the 
admissibility and the weight of such evidence remain within the 
IHO’s discretion, the limited case law supports the OSEP 
conclusion.23  Finally, although OSEP’s opinion is that “[a] State 
could not . . .  require that the participants in a resolution meeting 
keep the discussions confidential,”24 some states have adopted laws 
saying so.25 
 
8. After filing for the hearing, may the parent unilaterally waive the 
resolution session? 
 
No. Like mediation, which must be voluntary for each party,26 
waiving the resolution session must be mutual (and in writing).27  
Moreover, the regulations require delay of the due process hearing if 
the parent fails to participate in the resolution session in the absence 
of such mutual agreement, and they also authorize the IHO to dismiss 
the case upon the district’s motion if the parent’s refusal to 
                                                          
21 Id.   
22 Letter to Cohen, 67 IDELR ¶ 217 (OSEP 2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/15-004400r-il-cohen-
dph-9-9-15.pdf; Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-17; 
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool 
Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,704 (Aug. 14, 2006) 
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Baglin, 53 IDELR ¶ 164 
(OSEP 2008) (LEA may not require a parent to sign a confidentiality agreement as 
a condition for having a resolution session, but the parties could agree to 
confidentiality), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2008-
4/baglin103008dueprocess4q2008.pdf. 
23 E.g., Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Smith, 561 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
24 Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,704. 
25 E.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(9)(a)(3). 
26 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(1) (2018). 
27 Id. § 300.532(c)(3); see also Spencer v. District of Columbia, 416 F. Supp. 
2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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participate persists for the thirty-day period despite the district’s 
documented reasonable efforts to obtain parental participation.28 
 
9. Do difficulties communicating with the parents excuse a district’s 
delay in conducting the resolution session within the required fifteen-
day period? 
 
No, according to the federal district court in the District of Columbia, 
at least if the parent has legal representation.29 
 
10. After convening the resolution session, may the district refuse to 
discuss the issues raised in a parent's due process complaint, instead 
only offering to convene an IEP team meeting to address these 
issues? 
 
No, according to OSEP, this position would violate the IDEA.30 
 
11. In a case where the parent filed for the hearing and either party 
refused to participate in the resolution session, must the other party 
seek the IHO’s intervention? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP.31   
 
12. Would a parent’s refusal to participate in the resolution session in 
person justify an IHO’s dismissal of her due process complaint? 
 
No, according to OSEP, without considering whether the parent had 
valid reasons for refusing to physically attend the meeting.32  Indeed, 
if the parent informs the district in advance of the meeting that 
circumstances prevent attendance in person, the district must offer 
                                                          
28 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(3)–(4). 
29 Massey v. District of Columbia, 400 F. Supp. 2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2005). 
30 Letter to Casey, 61 IDELR ¶ 203 (OSEP 2013), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2013-
1/casey03272013resolutionsession1q2013.pdf. 
31 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-13. 
32 Letter to Walker, 59 IDELR ¶ 262 (OSEP 2012), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/12006705resmtgs3q201
2.pdf. 
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the parent alternative means of participation, such as telephone or 
videoconferencing.33 
 
13. Would a state law that permits postponement of the resolution 
timeline when the SEA or LEA receives the parent’s due process 
complaint shortly before or during an extended holiday break be 
consistent with the IDEA? 
 
No, not according to OSEP.34  The specified period is fifteen 
calendar days,35 and the only exceptions are the alternate agreements 
between the parent and the LEA either to waive the resolution 
meeting or to utilize the mediation process.36 
 
14. May the parties mutually agree to extend the fifteen-day 
resolution period to resolve an expedited due process complaint? 
 
No, according to OSEP.  The agency based its conclusion that this 
deadline was absolute on the lack of any such waiver authority in 34 
C.F.R. § 300.532(c) and the overriding purpose of promptness in the 
applicable disciplinary cases.37   
 
15. If fifteen days after the parent’s filing for a due process hearing, 
the school district fails to convene or participate in the resolution 
session, what may the parents do to move the matter forward? 
 
                                                          
33 Letter to Savit, 64 IDELR ¶ 250 (OSEP 2014), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/savit-dcps-policies1-1-
19-2016.pdf. 
34 Letter to Anderson, 110 LRP 70096 (OSEP Nov. 10, 2010),  
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2010-
4/anderson111010dph4q2010.pdf; see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra 
note 17, at item D-10. 
35 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b) 
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with 
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) (2018).  
36 See supra text accompanying notes 26–27. 
37 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item E-4; see also Letter to 
Gerl, 51 IDELR ¶ 166 (OSEP 2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2008-
2/gerl050108dueprocess2q2008.pdf. 
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The parent may seek the IHO’s intervention to start the timeline for 
the hearing.38  Additionally, a federal district court ruled that this 
parental right is voluntary; thus, the parent’s choice not to exercise it 
did not excuse the district’s failure.39 
 
16. If, after the parent files for a hearing, the parties neither waive nor 
hold the resolution session after thirty-one days, what happens on day 
thirty-one? 
 
According to OSEP, the forty-five-day timeline for conducting the 
hearing and issuing a decision starts on day thirty-one.40 
 
17. Does insufficiency of the complaint postpone the timeline or 
negate the requirement for the resolution session? 
 
Not according to OSEP.  More specifically, the commentary 
accompanying the regulations declared: “We agree with S. Rpt. No. 
108–185, p. 38 [i.e., the IDEA’s legislative history], which states that 
                                                          
38 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(5); see also Assistance to States for the Education of 
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,702 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  For 
varying judicial consequences, compare O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. District of Columbia, 
573 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that LEA’s failure to convene a 
resolution session constituted harmless error), with J.M.C. ex rel. E.G.C. v. La. Bd. 
of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 584 F. Supp. 894, 896 (M.D. La. 2008) (ruling 
that where LEA failed to convene the resolution session within fifteen days, the 
settlement agreement before due process hearing was not enforceable). 
39 Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. T.G. ex rel. Cheryl G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 
2011). 
40 Letter to Worthington, 51 IDELR ¶ 281 (OSEP 2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2008-
1/worthington031708dph1q2008.pdf.  However, mitigating this eventuality, OSEP 
also stated that the SEA has the responsibility to enforce the LEA’s affirmative 
obligation to convene the resolution meeting within fifteen days of receiving the 
parent’s complaint.  Id.  Moreover, state regulations may contribute to the 
conclusion that the failure to waive or hold the resolution session precludes holding 
the impartial hearing.  Colbert Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. B.R.T. ex rel. Cagle, 51 IDELR 
¶ 16 (N.D. Ala. 2008). 
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the resolution meeting should not be postponed when the LEA 
believes that a parent’s complaint is insufficient.”41 
 
18. Does a non-attorney parent advocate’s presence at the resolution 
session trigger the district’s qualified right to attend with its attorney? 
 
Not according to OSEP, even if the advocate is entitled under state 
law to represent the parent/student at a due process hearing.42   
 
19. What is the legal result if a parent fails or refuses to participate in 
the resolution session upon the district’s timely attempt to schedule 
the session within fifteen days? 
 
According to OSEP, the district’s obligation is to “continue to make 
diligent efforts throughout the remainder of the [thirty]-day 
resolution period to convince the parent to participate in a resolution 
meeting.”  Examples of such efforts include “detailed records of 
telephone calls made or attempted and the results of those calls and 
copies of correspondence sent to the parents and any responses 
received.”  Moreover, at the conclusion of this thirty-day period, the 
LEA “may request that a hearing officer dismiss the complaint when 
the LEA is unable to obtain the participation of a parent in a 
resolution meeting, despite making reasonable efforts to obtain the 
parent's participation and documenting its efforts.”43 
 
20. For violations of the resolution-session requirements, must the 
other party seek the intervention of the IHO? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP, “[t]he appropriate party must seek the 
hearing officer's intervention to either dismiss the complaint or to 
initiate the hearing timeline, depending on the circumstances.”44 
 
                                                          
41 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,698. 
42 Letter to Lawson, 55 IDELR ¶ 232 (OSEP 2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2010-
1/lawson020210dueprocess1q2010.pdf. 
43 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-7. 
44 Id. at item D-13. 
    
Fall 2018       Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers 43 
21. Does a district’s delay in conducting the resolution session 
constitute a denial of the IDEA obligation to provide a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE)? 
 
Not necessarily.45  
 
22. Must the district representative at the resolution session have 
final and absolute authority to resolve the complaint? 
 
Not quite, according to an unpublished decision.  In rejecting the 
superintendent and special education director in the circumstances of 
this case, the court concluded that said representative “satisfies the 
statutory requirement only if he or she, in fact, has the authority—by 
express delegation or otherwise—to make the decision about what 
the LEA will or will not do to resolve the issues presented in the 
IDEA complaint.”46 
 
23. Would the district’s violation of this requirement be the basis for 
an IHO order based on denial of FAPE? 
 
No, according to the same decision, without an evidentiary basis that 
this procedural violation impeded the child’s substantive right to 
FAPE.47 
 
B.  Sufficiency Process 
 
24. Does the IDEA require the noncomplaining party to specify the 




                                                          
45 E.g., J.D.G. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 748 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Del. 2010) (no 
denial of FAPE where parents contributed to the delay and no harm to child). 
46 J.Y. ex rel. E.Y. v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 33 (M.D. Ala. 
2014). 
47 Id. 
48 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2018). 
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25. What steps are available to the complaining party if an IHO rules 
that the due process complaint is insufficient? 
 
Citing the pertinent IDEA regulations and the comments 
accompanying them, OSEP answered that 1) the IHO must identify 
the specific insufficiencies in the notice; 2) the filing party may 
amend its complaint if the other party provides written consent and 
has an opportunity for mediation or a resolution session; 3) the IHO 
may, if the filing party does not exercise this amendment option, 
dismiss the insufficient complaint; and 4) the party may re-file if 
within the two-year limitations period.49 
 
26. If the filing party, with written consent from the other party, 
amends its complaint, do the fifteen-day timeline for the resolution 
meeting, the thirty-day resolution period and the party participation 
requirement re-commence? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP.50  
 
27. Have courts been supportive of strict IHO interpretations of the 
IDEA’s sufficiency requirements? 
 
The limited case law to date leaves the answer to this question 
unsettled.  The Third Circuit upheld an IHO’s dismissal of a case 
where the parent unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court’s 
characterization in Schaffer v. Weast51 of the IDEA’s pleading 
requirements as “minimal” allowed less than strict compliance with 
all of the required elements of the complaint.52  Yet, in another 
                                                          
49 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-4. 
50 Id. 
51 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
52 M.S.-G. v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 306 F. App’x 772 (3d 
Cir. 2009); cf. D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 596 F. App’x 49 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal for insufficiency based on IDEA pleading 
standards, without specifying them); H.T. ex rel. V.T. v. Hopewell Valley Reg’l 
Bd. of Educ., 66 IDELR ¶ 48 (D.N.J. 2015) (ruling that court lack jurisdiction but 
upholding, based on abundance of caution due to not clearly settled issue, IHO’s 
denial decision); Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. v. S.F. ex rel. Steven F., 50 IDELR ¶ 
104 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (ruling that IHO exceeded his authority by addressing claim 
not properly raised in the hearing complaint). 
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unpublished decision, the federal district court in New Hampshire 
reversed an IHO’s dismissal for insufficiency, alternatively citing 
with approval this dictum in Schaffer and the school district’s failure 
to contest the matter within the prescribed fifteen-day window.53  
Providing a third approach, the Eighth Circuit held, in an unpublished 
decision, that the IDEA does not provide for judicial review of IHO 
sufficiency decisions.54 
 
28. Conversely, do courts favor a strict interpretation of the IDEA’s 
requirements for the defendant’s response to the complaint? 
 
No, to the extent that the federal district court in the District of 
Columbia has ruled that a default judgment, i.e., dismissal with 
prejudice, would generally not be—without affecting the student's 
substantive rights—an appropriate sanction for failure to adhere to 
requirement.55 
 
C.  Jurisdiction 
 
29. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for violations of the prehearing, 
including sufficiency, process? 
 
Yes, at least for a district’s failure to send a prior written notice to the 
parent regarding the subject matter of the parent’s due process 
complaint and the failure to provide a response to the complaint 
within the resulting required ten days.56   
                                                          
53 Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 93 (D.N.H. 
2009); see also Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D. 
Ala. 2005); Anello v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 104 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2007).   
54 Knight ex rel. J.N.K. v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 416 F. App’x 594 (8th Cir. 2011); 
see also G.R. ex rel. Russell v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2, 823 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 
(D. Or. 2011).  According to Knight, the proper resolution for the IHO is to dismiss 
the case without, not with, prejudice.  Knight, 416 F. App’x at 595. 
55 Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia, 535 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19–20 
(D.D.C. 2008); Sykes v. District of Columbia, 518 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266–67 
(D.D.C. 2007).  
56 Letter to Inzelbuch, 62 IDELR ¶ 122 (OSEP 2013), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2013-
3/inzelbuch092413evaluation3q2013.pdf. 
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30. Other than unilateral placement (i.e., tuition reimbursement) 
cases, do IHOs have jurisdiction for the IDEA claims of a child who 
resides in, but is not enrolled, in the school district? 
 
The issue is not clearly settled.  According to a federal district court 
decision in the District of Columbia, the answer is yes.57  The court 
based its conclusion on the language of the IDEA that triggers a 
school district’s obligations, including Child Find, on residency, not 
enrollment.58  Other courts have extended this answer even if the 
child’s residency changes.59  OSEP agrees with this answer.60  
However, the Eighth Circuit answered the question no at least under 
a Minnesota law that requires the impartial hearing to be “‘conducted 
by and in the school district responsible for assuring that an 
appropriate program is provided.’”61  The court reasoned that such 
challenges were moot because the new school district is responsible 
for providing the hearing.62  The federal administrative agency 
subsequently explained that, “absent additional legal authority,” it 
could not take action contrary to change this jurisdictional 
difference.63   
 
Conversely, a decision within the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue 
of whether the IHO has jurisdiction for the case when the parents 
                                                          
57 D.S. v. District of Columbia, 699 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2010); see also 
L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012). 
58 This obligation is different from the child find and proportional-services 
obligations for children voluntarily placed in private schools, which are based on 
the school’s location, not the child’s residency.  See infra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
59 E.g., D.H. ex rel. R.H. v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist., 57 IDELR ¶ 162 (M.D. 
Ga. 2011); Alexis R. v. High Tech Middle Media Arts Sch., 53 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D. 
Cal. 2009); Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. P.C., 308 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Mich. 
2004).  
60 Letter to Goetz & Reilly, 57 IDELR ¶ 80 (OSEP 2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2010-
4/goetzreilly100410dph4q2010.pdf.  
61 Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 
1998) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 120.173(b)(3)(e), renumbered § 125A.50 (2018)). 
62 Id. at 578–79. 
63 Letter to Goetz & Reilly, 58 IDELR ¶ 230 (OSERS 2012). 
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moved their residence to outside the district and did not file for the 
hearing until after moving.64 
 
31. Who has the authority to determine whether a parent’s hearing 
request constitutes a new issue compared to the parent’s previous 
adjudicated request? 
 
According to OSEP commentary accompanying the 1999 IDEA 
regulations, this jurisdictional issue is for the IHO—not the school 
district (or the SEA)—to decide.65 
 
32. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues raised by the non-
complaining party during the pre-hearing or hearing process? 
 
Similarly, according to the OSEP commentary accompanying the 
2006 IDEA regulations, “such matters should be left to the discretion 
of [IHOs] in light of the particular facts and circumstances of a 
case.”66 
 
33. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for cases that the parent has previously 
subjected to CRP? 
 
Yes, and they are not bound by the CRP rulings.67  However, the IHO 
does not have jurisdiction in such cases as the appellate mechanism 
for the SEA’s CRP rulings.68 
                                                          
64 A.H. v. Independence Sch. Dist., 466 S.W.3d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
65 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the 
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 
12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); Letter to 
Wilde, 113 LRP 11932 (OSEP Oct. 3, 1990); see also Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-16. 
66 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
67 E.g., Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. P.C., 308 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Mich. 
2004); Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. M.K., 290 F. Supp. 2d 832 (W.D. 
Mich. 2003); Donlan v. Wells Ogunquit Cmty. Sch. Dist., 226 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. 
Me. 2002); Letter to Douglas, 35 IDELR ¶ 278 (OSEP 2001), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2001-
2/douglas041901dueprocess.pdf; Letter to Governors & Chief State Sch. Officers, 
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34. Do IHOs have jurisdiction over FAPE issues for students whom 
parents have voluntarily placed in private, including parochial, 
schools (in contrast with those unilaterally placed for tuition 
reimbursement)? 
 
No, except for the Child Find obligation of the school district where 
the private school is located.69  Arguably, an additional exception is 
the extent that a few courts have interpreted state laws, such as those 
providing for dual enrollment, as extending LEA obligations for 
special education and related services to parentally-placed children in 
private schools.70 
 
35. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to decide the child’s residency as a 
threshold issue antecedent to the IDEA merits of the case? 
 
Yes, according to limited authority to date.71 
 
                                                          
34 IDELR ¶ 264 (OSEP 2000), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2000-
3/memo82900authorizationsec.pdf; Letter to Lieberman, 23 IDELR 351 (OSEP 
1995). 
68 E.g., Va. Office of Protection & Advocacy v. Va., 262 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. 
Va. 2003); see also Millay ex rel. YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep’t, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56 
(D. Me. 2010). 
69 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.140 (2018).  For applications of this regulation, see, for example, 
C.F. ex rel. Flick v. Del. Cty. Intermediate Unit, 70 IDELR ¶ 250 (E.D. Pa. 2017); 
W. v. Sch. Bd., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. 
Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.N.H. 2003) 
70 E.g., Veschi v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 772 A.2d 469 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2001), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 382 (Pa. 2001); Dep’t of Educ. v. Grosse Point 
Sch., 701 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); R.M.M. ex rel. Morales v. 
Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).  In its commentary 
accompanying the 2006 IDEA regulations, OSEP opined that “[w]hether dual 
enrollment alters the rights of parentally-placed private school children with 
disabilities under State law is a State matter.”  Assistance to States for the 
Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With 
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,590. 
71 E.g., A.P. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 294 F. Supp. 3d 406 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
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36. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for Child Find claims, although the 
IDEA is ambiguous or silent about this issue? 
 
Yes, according to a Ninth Circuit decision.72 
 





38. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for district’s promotion and retention 
decisions? 
 
No, according to OSEP, unless related to FAPE or placement, such as 
where “a student does not receive the services that are specified on 
his or her IEP that were designed to assist the student in meeting the 
promotion standards.”74  Moreover, such matters may be regarded as 
within the school district’s exclusive authority.75 
 
39. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for claims of systemic IDEA 
violations? 
 
Although there may be exceptions where the issue is relatively 
limited, and a single plaintiff is bringing the claim, the IHO generally 
does not have jurisdiction for class-action type claims.76 
 
40. Do IHOs have jurisdiction in terms of SEAs as defendants? 
 
Not in most cases.77 
                                                          
72 Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). 
73 Lillbask ex rel. R.H. v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005). 
74 Letter to Anonymous, 35 IDELR ¶ 35 (OSEP 2000), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2000-
4/redact110900promotion.4q2000.pdf. 
75 Cf. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert O., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2001) (ruling the IHO’s remedy was ultra vires for gifted student). 
76 E.g., N.J. Protection & Advocacy v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 2d 
474 (D.N.J. 2008). 
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41. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to determine and order the stay-put for 




42. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for parental challenges to an IEP that 
the parent agreed to or an IEP that is not the most recent one? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP, provided that the filing is within the 
prescribed statute of limitations.79 
 
43. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to override a parent’s refusal to 
provide consent for initial services or for a parent’s subsequent 
revocation of consent for continued services? 
 
No, the regulations are rather clear that these matters are no longer 
within the IHO’s jurisdiction.80  However, on the opposite side, the 
commentary to the amended IDEA regulations add this clarification 
for selective refusals:  
 
If, however, the parent and the [district] disagree 
about whether the child would be provided with FAPE 
if the child did not receive a particular special 
education or related service, the parent may use the 
due process procedures in subpart E of these 
                                                          
77 E.g., Chavez v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 621 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010); cf. 
R.W. ex rel. M.W. v. Ga. Dep’t of Educ., 48 IDELR ¶ 279 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d, 
353 F. App’x 422 (11th Cir. 2009).  
78 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,704 (Aug. 
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Stohrer, 17 
IDELR 55 (OSEP 1990); Letter to Chassey, 30 IDELR ¶ 51 (OSEP 1997).  For 
stay-put generally, see Perry A. Zirkel, “Stay-Put” under the IDEA: An Updated 
Annotated Overview, 330 EDUC. L. REP. 8 (2016).  For the strong status of the 
IHO’s stay-put order upon a party’s challenge to it in court, see Abington Heights 
Sch. Dist. v. A.C., 63 IDELR ¶ 97 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
79 Letter to Lipsitt, 52 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2008). 
80 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(3)(i), (4)(ii) (2018). 
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regulations to obtain a ruling that the service with 
which the parent disagrees is not appropriate for their 
child.81 
 
44. What if the parent’s refusal is for consent for an initial evaluation 
and the child is either parentally placed in a private school or is 
home-schooled? 
 
Similarly, the IHO does not have jurisdiction to override the parent’s 
refusal.82 
 
45. Do IHOs have jurisdiction in disputes between two parents, who 
both have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child, 
with regard to consent or revocation of consent for special education 
services? 
 
No, according to OSEP’s interpretation.  IHOs do not have 
jurisdiction for any disputes between parents as compared to disputes 
between parents and “public agencies.”83  In such cases, the IDEA 
allows either parent to provide or revoke consent, with their 
disagreements being subject exclusively (i.e., not under the IDEA) to 
the resolution mechanisms available “based on State or local law.”84  
Such consent disputes when concerned with evaluation, rather than 
services, may be another matter.85 
                                                          
81 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,006, 73,011 (Dec. 
1, 2008) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-12-01/pdf/FR-2008-12-01.pdf. 
82 Id. § 300.300(d)(4); see also Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-III Sch. Dist., 439 
F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006); Durkee v. Livonia Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 313 
(W.D.N.Y. 2007).    
83 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a).    
84 Letter to Cox, 54 IDELR ¶ 60 (OSEP 2009), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2009-
3/cox082109revocationofconsent3q2009.pdf; see also Letter to Ward, 56 IDELR ¶ 
237 (OSEP 2010), 
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/idea/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2010-
3/ward083110revocofconsent3q2010.pdf. 
85 E.g., J.H. v. Northfield Pub. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 165 (D. Minn. 2009); 
Zeichner v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 881 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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46. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues arising concerning the 
education records of the child? 
 
Although various hearing and review officers have broadly answered 
this question with a “no,” often based on the coverage of FERPA,86 
the more defensible answer would appear to be “it depends” in light 
of the overlapping coverage of the IDEA.  More specifically, if the 
student records issue concerns the identification, evaluation, FAPE, 
or placement of the child, it would appear to be within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the IHO,87 with one possible exception—if the issue 
concerns amending the child’s records (based, for example, on 
inaccurate or misleading information), the IDEA regulations may be 
interpreted as reserving the matter exclusively for the FERPA 
hearing procedure.88 
 
47. Do IHOs have jurisdiction where the district offered, and the 
parent refused, a settlement prior to the hearing that offered all the 
relief that the parents sought? 
 
Yes, according to an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision that 
reasoned, apparently properly, that the effect under the IDEA may be 
in terms of precluding recovery of attorneys’ fees but not subject 
matter jurisdiction.89 
 
                                                          
86 E.g., Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR ¶ 221 (Mo. SEA 2004); Fairfax Cty. 
Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 275 (Va. SEA 2003); Bourne Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR ¶ 261 
(Mass. SEA 2002).  
87 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a), 300.613–21.  Additionally, a federal court 
concluded that the IDEA reference (at Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2017)) to “all records” is more expansive than “education 
records” under FERPA.  Pollack ex rel. B.P. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 65 IDELR ¶ 
206 (D. Me. 2015). 
88 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.619-621.  The additional scope of education records that, 
alternatively, “are otherwise in violation of the privacy or other rights of the child” 
extends the boundaries of the exception potentially to swallow the rule.  Id. § 
300.619.  The opposing interpretation is that these regulations require, exhaustion-
like, resort to the FERPA hearing procedure as a prerequisite for IHO jurisdiction. 
89 A.O. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 368 F. App’x 539 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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48. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for enforcement of private settlement 
agreements? 
 
The limited case law is unsettled on this question.  Some jurisdictions 
support an affirmative answer,90  but other courts say no.91  OSEP has 
stated that 1) the IDEA only provides for judicial enforcement of 
settlement agreements as part of mediation or the resolution process, 
and 2) a state may have uniform rules specific to an IHO’s authority 
or lack of authority to review and enforce settlement agreements 
reached outside of the mediation or resolution processes.92  Whether 
exhaustion applies to judicial enforcement of settlement agreements 
is a separate issue, which depends in part on the terms of the 
settlement agreement.93 
 
                                                          
90 E.g., Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 202 (D. Conn. 2000); State v. v. 
Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 307 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010); cf. Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Jeffrey B., 55 IDELR ¶ 158 
(N.D. Ohio 2010); D.B.A. ex rel. Snerlling v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Civ. No. 10-
1045 (PAM/FLN), 2010 WL 5300946 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2010) (upholding IHO’s 
authority to enforce mediated settlement agreement within limited circumstances); 
State ex rel. St. Joseph Sch. v. Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 307 
S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction to decide 
whether settlement agreement existed and, if so, whether either party failed to 
comply with it); I.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. 
Pa. 2013), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014); A.S. v. Office for Dispute 
Resolution, 88 A.3d 256 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction 
to decide whether settlement agreement existed); Smith v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction for 
interrelated claim for additional compensatory education).   
91 E.g., H.C. v. Colton-Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist., 341 F. App’x 687 (2d Cir. 
2009); W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. A.M., 164 A.3d 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017); 
J.K. v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 833 F. Supp. 2d 436, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Sch. 
Bd. of Lee Cty. v. M.C. ex rel. B.C., 35 IDELR ¶ 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).  
The West Chester Area School District decision also addressed whether the IHO 
had jurisdiction to address the parent’s duress claim for the settlement agreement, 
concluding that such jurisdiction existed under Pennsylvania law. W. Chester Area 
Sch. Dist., 164 A.3d at 627. 
92 Letter to Shaw, 50 IDELR ¶ 78 (OSEP 2007), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-
4/shaw121207dph4q2007.pdf. 
93 F.H. v. Memphis City Sch., 64 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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49. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to enforce a previous IHO decision, an 
issue typically arising when the parent claims that the school district 
failed to implement the order(s) of the previous decision?  
 
No.  The prevailing view is that the two appropriate forums are the 
state CRP under the IDEA94 and, alternatively via various legal 
bases, the courts,95 rather than the IHO process.96 
                                                          
94 E.g., Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 
(9th Cir. 2000); B.D. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 225 (D.D.C. 2014); 
Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 115 (N.Y. SEA 2006); 
Crown Point Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 269 (N.Y. SEA 2006); Newtown Bd. of 
Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 201 (Conn. SEA 2004); see also Dispute Resolution 
Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-26.  But cf. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
M.L. ex rel. D.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (allowing IHO enforcement 
based on state law).  However, parents need not exhaust the state’s CRP before 
seeking judicial enforcement of an IHO order.  Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d 
1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).  Moreover, CRP—in contrast to a court—does not have 
jurisdiction for an IHO’s refusal to hear or decide an issue.  Letter to Hathcock, 19 
IDELR 631 (OSEP 1993); cf. Letter to Jacobs, 48 IDELR ¶ 287 (OSEP 2007) 
(interpreting the IDEA to allow appeals of IHO decisions to court—or. presumably, 
to the second tier in the two-tier states—but not to the SEA where the IHO does not 
work under the auspices of a “public agency,” such as when a separate state office 
of administrative law conducts the hearing), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-
4/jacobs102507dph4q2007.pdf. 
95 The usual procedure is a § 1983 action.  E.g., Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon 
Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 
1270, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1987); Dominique L. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 56 
IDELR ¶ 65 (N.D. Ill. 2011); L.J. ex rel. V.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR 
¶ 100 (D.N.J. 2006).  However, the § 1983 avenue may be open only to parents, not 
districts.  E.g., Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buskirk, 950 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ind. 
1997).  Another alternative is under Section 504 and the ADA.  E.g., Stropkay v. 
Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 593 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014); A. v. Hartford 
Bd. of Educ., 976 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D. Conn. 2013); T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San 
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 152 (S.D. Cal. 2011).  Where the district 
belatedly implemented the IHOs orders, a federal court ruled that the parents 
lacked standing for such an enforcement action.  A.S. v. Harrison Twp. Bd. of 
Educ., 66 F. Supp. 3d 539, 550 (D.N.J. 2014).  Finally, the courts are split as to 
whether the IDEA is a viable avenue for judicial enforcement.  E.g., B.D. v. 
District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing the case law to 
date and rejecting the view that a particular provision of the IDEA provides such a 
cause of action). 
96 However, the concurring judge in a recent federal appeals court decision 
pointed to the U.S. Department of Education’s brief in a previous case to conclude 
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50. Do IHOs have the authority—whether viewed as a matter of 
jurisdiction or remedies—to raise and resolve an issue sua sponte, 
i.e., on their own without either party raising it? 
 
This issue is unsettled.  An OSEP policy interpretation seems to 
suggest a “yes” answer for the particular issue of the child’s “stay-
put.”97  On the other hand, the limited case law arguably answers 
“no” to this question more generally whether viewed as a matter of 
the underlying issue or the predicate remedy, whether for 
declaratory98 or injunctive99 relief. 
                                                          
that the IHO route “might” be viable.  B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 
803–04 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  Moreover, where the district is the initiating party, the 
answer may vary.  Compare Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.U., 63 IDELR ¶ 250 
(E.D. Cal. 2014), with Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 2d 920 
(N.D. Ill. 2010).  For the related issue of whether the IHO has the jurisdiction to 
reopen the case upon the request of either party for enforcement purposes, see Bd. 
of Educ. of Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337 (N.Y. SEA 1998).  For the 
applicable time period for implementation, see Letter to Voigt, 64 IDELR ¶ 220 
(OSEP 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acc-11-
020700r-pa-voigt-dueprocesshearingdecisions.pdf. 
97 Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997).  The question to OSEP 
contained the at least partial sua sponte condition that “stay put is not raised as an 
issue during the pre-hearing stages,” but the answer did not specifically 
differentiate this contingency. 
98 E.g., C.W.L. v. Pelham Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 3d 451 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Saki ex rel. Saki v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 103 (D. 
Haw. 2008); Mifflin Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process Appeals Bd., 800 
A.2d 1010 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Bd. of Educ. v. Redovian, 18 IDELR 1092 
(N.D. Ohio 1992).  The third case provides only limited authority, because the 
court was addressing the authority of the second-tier review panel, not the IHO, 
and its rationale included that doing so “without the benefit of a full factual record 
and adjudication on the issue [would result in] in a premature interruption of the 
administrative process.”  Mifflin Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process 
Appeals Bd., 800 A.2d at 1014. 
99 E.g., District of Columbia v. Walker, 109 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2015); 
Lofisa S. ex rel. S.S. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 60 IDELR ¶ 191 (D. Haw. 2013); 
Sch. Bd. of Martin Cty. v. A.S., 727 So.2d 1071 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); cf. 
Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B. ex rel. Blake B., 26 IDELR 827 (E.D. Pa. 1997); 
Slack v. Del. Dep’t of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1993); Mars Area Sch. 
Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (ruling specific to IDEA 
review officers).  The first decision was the only one specific to IHOs, and it is 
ambiguous as to whether the basis was functus officio rather than sua sponte. 
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51. Does expiration of the forty-five-day period prior to the start of 
the hearing, including any extensions,  deprive the IHO of 
jurisdiction for the case? 
 
No, according to a federal district court decision in Hawaii.  Contrary 
to the IHO’s interpretation, the court concluded that this automatic 
divestiture of jurisdiction would “fl[y] in the face of the very spirit of 
the IDEA” and could result in a “serious injustice” to the rights of the 
parent and child with a disability.100 
 
52. In a disciplinary hearing, where manifestation determination is at 
issue, does the IHO have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
student violated the school’s code of conduct? 
 
Yes.  More specifically, according to OSEP, “there may be instances 
where a hearing officer, in his discretion, would address whether 
such a violation has occurred.”101 
 
53. Do IHOs have the authority to dispose of a case on the grounds of 
mootness? 
 
Yes, but they should make sure that the case meets the applicable 
relatively narrow standard for mootness.102 
 
54. Do IHOs have jurisdiction when the parent names a SEA as a 
defendant? 
 
According to OSEP, this issue is within the IHO’s discretionary 
authority.  More specifically, the IHO “has the authority to 
determine, based on the individual facts and circumstances in the 
                                                          
100 Paul K. ex rel. Joshua K. v. State of Haw., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (D. 
Haw. 2008). 
101 Letter to Ramirez, 60 IDELR ¶ 230 (OSEP 2012); cf. District of Columbia 
v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that this issue is within IHO’s 
authority if matter of FAPE). 
102 E.g., Morris v. District of Columbia, 38 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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case, whether the SEA is a proper party to the due process 
hearing.”103 
 
55. May a state, through its procedures, or the IHO limit the issues to 
those previously raised at the IEP team level? 
 
Not according to OSEP, because such limits “would impose 
additional procedural hurdles on the right to a due process hearing 
that are not contemplated by the IDEA.”104 
 
56. Do IHOs have remedial authority for the extent of related 
services determined by another agency via an interagency agreement 
under state law? 
 
Yes, according to a Ninth Circuit decision. However, the answer 
ultimately depends not only on the IDEA but also the state (which, in 
this case, was California) law.105   
 
D.  Timelines in General 
 
57. If the district allegedly failed to respond to the parents’ due 
process complaint within the required ten-day period, what is the 
appropriate avenue of relief? 
 
                                                          
103 Letter to Anonymous, 69 IDELR ¶ 189 (OSEP 2017), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl-anonymous-due-
process-01-02-2017.pdf.  For the overlapping case law, including the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Chavez v. New Mexico Public Education Department, 621 
F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010) that OSEP indirectly cited, see Perry A. Zirkel, State 
Education Agencies as Defendants under the IDEA and Related Federal Laws: A 
Compilation of the Court Decisions, 336 EDUC. L. REP. 667 (2016).     
104 Letter to Lenz, 37 IDELR ¶ 95 (OSEP 2002), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2002-1/lenz030602notice.pdf; 
see also Letter to Dowaliby, 38 IDELR ¶ 14 (OSEP 2002), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2002-2/dowaliby062602-
2q2002.pdf; Letter to Zimberlin, 34 IDELR ¶ 150 (OSEP 2000), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2000-
4/zimberlin101900dueprocess.4q2000.pdf. 
105 Douglas v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 650 F. App’x 312 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
    
58 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 38-2 
According to OSEP, the appropriate recourse is for the parents to 
proceed with the hearing, with the IHO having the discretion to 
identify and resolve this issue.106   
 
58. What is the statute of limitations for filing for a due process 
hearing under the IDEA? 
 
In short, two years unless state law prescribes a different period.107  
However, the interpretation and application of the statutory language, 
which the regulations repeat without elaboration, are complicated.  
The complications include (1) determination of the triggering point 
of when the parent or district had actual or constructive notice of the 
alleged action; (2) the scope of the two specified exceptions; and (3) 
the potentially broadening effect of the alleged action and its 
redressability. 108 
 
59. Does the IDEA’s statute of limitations for an impartial hearing 
call for a “look back” approach from the filing date? 
 
No, the starting point is the date that the filing party “knew of should 
have known” of the alleged violation.109 
 
60. Have courts generally interpreted the exceptions for the 
limitations period broadly or narrowly? 
 
Although the case law is limited and not uniform, the majority of 
courts have taken a rather narrow view.110 
 
                                                          
106 Letter to Inzelbuch, supra note 56.  Given its overlapping subject matter 
and breadth, this OSEP letter is also included in the Jurisdiction section.  Id. 
107 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B), 
(f)(3)(C)-(D) (2017).   
108 For a systematic synthesis of the case law, see Perry A. Zirkel, The Statute 
of Limitations for an Impartial Hearing Under the IDEA: A Guiding Checklist, 363 
Ed. Law Rep. 483 (2019). 
109 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). 
110 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 108, at 487 nn.34 & 36. 
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61. If the IHO exceeds the forty-five-day regulatory deadline, is a 
reviewing court likely to provide the challenging party with remedial 
relief? 
 
Not in the majority of the cases, because the courts treat it as a 
procedural violation, which often does not result in harm to the 
student.  For example, in a Seventh Circuit case where the court 
upheld the IHO’s decision that the district had provided an 
appropriate program for the child, the parent’s claim was to no 
avail.111  Conversely, in the minority of cases where the court 
concludes that this procedural violation is prejudicial, this conclusion 
may contribute to one or more consequences to the defendant LEA—
attorneys’ fees,112 an exception to the exhaustion doctrine,113 the 
                                                          
111 Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1995); see also J.D. v. Pawlet 
Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000); Amann v. Stow, 982 F.3d 644 (1st Cir. 
1992); Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 133 (D. Ariz. 2017); 
Oskowis v. Sedona-Oak Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 150 (D. Ariz. 
2016); O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. District of Columbia, 573 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 
2008); Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2008); E.M. 
v. Pajaro Valley Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 39 (E.D. Cal. 2007); G.W. v. New Haven 
Unified Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 103 (ND. Cal. 2006); Grant ex rel. Sunderlin v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 43 IDELR ¶ 219 (D. Minn. 2005). 
112 E.g., Miller v. Monroe Sch. Dist., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2015) 
(awarding tuition reimbursement); cf. K.J. ex rel. K.J., Jr. v. Greater Egg Harbor 
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 179 (D.N.J. 2015); Rose ex rel. Rose v. 
Chester Cty. Intermediate Unit, 24 IDELR 61 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d mem., 114 
F.3d 1173 (3d Cir. 1997) (suggesting possible § 504 violation).  Other courts have 
identified consequences in terms of attorneys’ fees.  E.g., Scorah v. District of 
Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2004) (contributing to attorneys’ fees 
award); Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (ruling that state violated IDEA timeliness requirement for failing to take 
appropriate action in response to IHO’s failure to issue her decision after a 
protracted period, resulting in attorneys’ fees and possibly other consequences 
adverse to the LEA or SEA); Bd. of Educ. of Green Local Sch. Dist. v. Redovian, 
18 IDELR 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (suggesting possible attorneys’ fees where no 
denial of FAPE).   But see K.C. ex rel. Eric C. v. N.Y.C. Educ. Dep’t, 66 IDELR ¶ 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (ruling that plaintiff-parents obtaining the requested relief in 
terms of receiving overdue, but unfavorable decision does not qualify them as 
prevailing parties for attorneys’ fees). 
113 E.g., M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 
McAdams v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 2d 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).   
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extension of the period for tuition reimbursement,114 other 
remediable denial of FAPE,115 or the possibility (under § 504) of 
compensatory damages.116  A district’s failure to process the parents’ 
request for an impartial hearing is a separate matter; in flagrant 
circumstances a court may order remedial relief even in the absence 
of denial of FAPE.117  Regardless of the judicial consequences, OSEP 
continues to emphasize its responsibility to monitor compliance with 
this timeline, with the limited exception being for allowable 
extensions.118 
 
62. Do the IDEA regulations’ allowance for extensions excuse any 
such alleged delay? 
 
Yes, but 1) the extensions must be requested by a party (not 
unilaterally by the IHO) and for specific periods of time;119 and 2) the 
defendant agency—whether the LEA or the SEA—ultimately must 
show the documentation and justification for the extensions.120  
                                                          
114 E.g., Rose, 24 IDELR 61.  But cf. C.W. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395 
F. App’x 824 (3d Cir. 2010) (not where no denial of FAPE).  
115 Miller v. Monroe Sch. Dist., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2015) 
(ruled that the district denied FAPE to the child for the 142-day period beyond the 
seventy-five-day timeline that was attributable to district-requested, parent-
objected-to postponements, entitling parent to tuition reimbursement for that 
limited period of FAPE denial); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 
71, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (ruling that systemic failure to provide timely hearings and 
decisions was per se violation of FAPE); cf. Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. T.G. ex rel. 
Cheryl G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 2011) (adopting per se denial of FAPE 
approach for outright denial to provide a hearing). 
116 K.J., 65 IDELR ¶ 179 (dismissing IDEA claim as moot but denying 
dismissal of § 504 money damages claim). 
117 I.R. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2015). 
118 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-21. 
119 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018).  According to OSEP, the IHO need not grant the 
request for an extension, and where the IHO does grant it, the IHO must provide 
the parties with notice of not only this ruling but also the specific date for the final 
decision.  Letter to Kerr, 22 IDELR 364 (OSEP 1994).  More recently, OSEP 
emphasized that the extension must be for a specific period even if the requesting 
party does not specify a time period.  Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 
17, at item C-22. 
120 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Conn. 
2000); see also L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 125 F. App’x 252 (10th Cir. 2005).  
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63. Does the IHO have discretion to deny such requests? 
 
Yes, subject to state law,121 denying continuances is within an IHO’s 
good faith discretion with due consideration to unrepresented 
parents.122  
 
64. May states specify time lines that differ from those that the IDEA 
specifies for situations not expressly authorized in the IDEA? 
 
Not, under the preemption doctrine,123 if they provide less protection 
to the child, unless the IDEA expressly provides for state variation, 
as it does for the limitations periods124 or for evaluation.125 
 
65. Does the SEA’s monitoring responsibility to assure correction of 
noncompliance within one year limit the IHO’s remedial order for 
compensatory education to one year? 
                                                          
For related dicta as to the possible consequences of abusing the extension 
exception, see Doe v. East Greenwich School Department, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 
2006). 
121 E.g., Lake Washington Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Superintendent of 
Pub. Instruction, 51 IDELR ¶ 278 (D. Wash. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 
2011); J.S. ex rel. John S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (upholding IHO’s discretion to refuse postponement under applicable N.Y. 
regulation); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 253 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) (refusing district’s request to enjoin IHO’s extension to parent under 
state “good cause” standard). 
122 E.g., P.J. v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist. 248 F. App’x 775 (9th Cir. 2007); 
A.S. v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 62 (E.D. Pa. 2014); J.D. ex rel. Davis 
v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 225 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), aff’d mem., 
357 F. App’x 515 (4th Cir. 2009); Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndborough Cooperative 
Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 299 (D.N.H. 2007); D.Z v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2 
A.3d 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); O’Neil v. Shamokin Area Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR 
¶ 154 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004); cf. Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 
655 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting 14th Amendment procedural due 
process claim). 
123 The doctrine, which is based on the supremacy clause in the Constitution, 
applies at least if the conflict, and Congressional intent for supplanting state law, is 
“clear and manifest.”  E.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995). 
124 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), 300.516(b). 
125 Id. § 300.301(c). 
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No, not in light of the statute of limitations and broad IHO remedial 
authority under the IDEA.  OSEP recently appeared to agree with the 
inapplicability or at least relaxed applicability of the regulation 
requiring the state to correct noncompliance “as soon as possible, and 
in no case later than one year”126 by opining that “hearing decisions 
must be implemented within the timeframe prescribed by the [IHO] 
or, if there is no timeframe prescribed by the [IHO], within a 
reasonable timeframe set by the State as required by 34 CFR §§ 
500.111–300.514.”127  Nevertheless, it is effective practice for IHOs 
write their remedial orders in such a way that the state can verify the 
district’s initiation of implementation and plan for completion of the 
award. 
 
E.  Expedited Hearings 
 
66. Under what circumstances is the parent entitled to an expedited 
hearing? 
 
The IDEA regulations require the opportunity for an expedited 
hearing when the parent challenges a manifestation determination or 
any other aspect of a district-imposed disciplinary change in 
placement or interim alternate educational setting.128  
 
67. Under what circumstances are school districts entitled to an 
expedited hearing? 
 
The school district must have the opportunity for such a hearing upon 
requesting an interim alternate educational setting based on 
substantial likelihood of the current placement resulting in injury to 
the child or others.129 
 
68. What is the timeline for an expedited hearing? 
                                                          
126 Id. § 300.600(e). 
127 Letter to Zirkel, 68 IDELR ¶ 142 (OSEP 2016). 
128 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1). 
129 Id.; see also Letter to Huefner, 47 IDELR ¶ 228 (OSEP 2007), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-
1/huefner030807stayput1q2007.pdf. 
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Unless the state has adopted different procedural rules, the deadlines 
are as follows, starting with the receipt of the complaint: resolution 
session – within seven days; hearing – within twenty school days; 
decision – within thirty school days (actually, within ten school days 
of the hearing if the hearing is more than one session).130 According 
to OSEP, the reference to “school days” for the second and third 
parts of this specified schedule includes days during the summer 
period for school districts that “operate summer school programs for 
both students with, and students without, disabilities,” but not when 
the summer programming is only ESY.131  Moreover, OSEP clarified 
that the overall forty-five-day deadline, upon completion of the 
resolution period, applies regardless of whether the summer days 
count for these two steps.132 
 
69. Do the IDEA provisions for specific IHO extensions apply, 
whether directly upon the request of one or both parties or via state 
law, to expedited hearings? 
 
Apparently not, because—as summarized in the previous item—the 
IDEA regulation for expedited hearings provides its own timeline 
and the express allowance for state law variations preserves these 
deadlines. 133   OSEP recently reached this conclusion, reasoning that 
“[t]here is no provision in the Part B regulations that would give a 
                                                          
130 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2)-(4).  The references to school days would seem 
to conflict during the summer months with the general requirement for issuance of 
the decision within forty-five calendar days after completion of the resolution-
session period.  Id. § 300.515(a).  However, the absence of extensions, or 
postponements, in the regulations for expedited hearings potentially mitigates this 
possible conflict. 
131 Letter to Fletcher, 72 IDELR ¶ 275 (OSEP 2018), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-to-fletcher-
08-23-2018.pdf; Letter to Cox, 59 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/06-22-
12expdph3q2012.pdf; see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at 
item E-5. 
132 Id. 
133 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(4).  However, the accompanying preserved cross-
referenced regulations for non-expedited hearings do not include the one 
concerning extensions.  Id. § 300.515(c). 
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hearing officer conducting an expedited due process hearing the 
authority to extend the timeline for issuing this determination at the 
request of a party to the expedited due process hearing.”134   More 
recently, OSEP reaffirmed this conclusion, emphasizing that waiver 
of the IDEA timeline for expedited hearings is not permissible.135 
 
70. In expedited hearings, does the usual five-day disclosure rule 
apply or does a special two-day rule replace it? 
 
Although the proposed IDEA regulations contained a two-day 
exception for expedited hearings, the final version retained the five-
day rule without exception.136  The Agency’s stated reasoning was 
that “limiting the disclosure time to two days would significantly 
impair the ability of the parties to prepare for the hearing, since one 
purpose of the expedited hearing is to provide protection to the 
child.”137 In an analogous case under state law, a federal court in 
New Jersey remanded the case back to the IHO for a new hearing 
based on the prejudicial effect of not providing the requisite five-day 
notice.138 
 
71. For expedited hearings, may a party challenge the sufficiency of 
the complaint or may an IHO otherwise extend the timeline for 
completion? 
 
No, according to OSEP.139 
 
                                                          
134 Letter to Snyder, 67 IDELR ¶ 96 (OSEP 2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/15-012744-ca-snyder-
exdueprocess-clearance.pdf. 
135 Letter to Zirkel, 68 IDELR ¶ 142 (OSEP 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/oseplettertozirkel8-22-
16.pdf. 
136 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (incorporating id. § 300.512(a)(3) without 
exception). 
137 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,726 (Aug. 
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
138 B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014). 
139 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item E-6.  
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72. Do the requirements for expedited hearings apply if the hearing 
request encompasses both the requisite disciplinary circumstances 
and one or more other issues? 
 
In light of the qualified discretion accorded to IHOs, OSEP opines 
that in such cases “a hearing officer could decide that it is prudent to 
bifurcate the hearing, thus allowing for an expedited hearing on the 
discipline and removal issues, and a separate hearing on any other 
issues.”140 
 
F. Prehearing and Hearing Procedures, Including Evidentiary 
Matters 
 
73. Does a school district practice of providing the IHO with a copy 
of the student’s records immediately upon receiving notice of the 
IHO’s appointment violate the IDEA, including its incorporated 
FERPA requirements? 
 
Not according to OSEP, regardless of whether the parent or the 
district was the filing party.141  
 
74. Are discovery procedures available in IDEA due process 
hearings? 
 
The IDEA does not provide for discovery (beyond the five-day 
rule),142 and only a minority of state laws provide for it in IDEA 
hearings.143  If state law is silent in this matter, OSEP has stated that 
whether discovery procedures are available and, if so, their nature 
and extent are within the discretion of the IHO. 144  In a Florida case, 
the appellate court held that in the absence of state law the IHO 
                                                          
140 Letter to Snyder, supra note 134. 
141 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996). 
142 E.g., B.H. ex rel. S.H. v. Joliet Sch. Dist. No. 86, 54 IDELR ¶ 121 (N.D. Ill. 
2010); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806 
(N.D. Ohio 2009). 
143 Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (identifying 19 states that have some form of 
discovery though not necessarily the full procedures of civil courts). 
144 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996). 
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lacked authority to order discovery.145 However, a year later the 
Florida’s legislature repealed the exemption of IDEA hearings from 
the statute providing such authority.146  In the minority of 
jurisdictions that allow for discovery in IDEA cases, such as Florida 
and Massachusetts, related legal issues come to the fore.147 
 
75. Does the IDEA require a prehearing conference? 
 
No, although it is generally regarded as best practice for IHOs, and 
some state laws require it.148 
 
76. Does the IDEA specify the time or place for the hearing? 
 
No, except that the time and place be reasonably convenient to the 
parents and the child.149 
 
77. Must the IHO enter a default judgment against the district for 
failing to file a sufficient response to the parents' complaint within 
ten days of service? 
 
No, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the IDEA only requires the 
district to “send to the parent a response” to the complaint and, thus, 
“[a] due process hearing is the redress for an unsatisfactory 
response.”150 
 
78. What is the proper procedure if the district fails to file any 
response at all to the complaint?  
 
                                                          
145 S.T. ex rel. S.F. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 783 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
146 FLA. STAT. § 120.569(2)(f) (2018).  
147 E.g., Andover Pub. Sch., 68 IDELR ¶ 208 (Mass. SEA 2016) (partially 
granting parent’s discovery request, specifically allowing for the redacted IEPs and 
504 plans, but not the other specified information, for other students in the child’s 
proposed placement).  
148 E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02a(g)(40) (2018). 
149 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(d) (2018). 
150 G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 F. 
App‘x 698, 699 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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According to the Ninth Circuit, rather than go forward with the 
hearing, the IHO “must order a response and shift the cost of the 
delay to the school district, regardless of who is ultimately the 
prevailing party.”151  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit advised that the 
IHO should raise the issue sua sponte even if the parent does not 
make a motion on this matter.152 
 
79.  Does the IDEA allow the filing party to amend the complaint? 
 
Yes, but only if (a) the other party consents in writing to the 
amendment and has the opportunity to resolve the due process 
complaint through the resolution meeting; or (b) the IHO grants 
permission no later than five calendar days before the first hearing 
session.153 
 
80. Do IHOs have authority to dismiss a case and, if so, with 
prejudice?  
  
IHOs certainly have the authority for dismissal in certain 
circumstances.154  First, the IDEA regulations provide some of these 
circumstances, such as explicitly authorizing dismissals with regard 
to parents’ failure to participate in resolution sessions155 and 
implicitly authorizing dismissals with regard to complaints that the 
hearing officer deems to be insufficient.156   
 
                                                          
151 M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 
1189, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2017). 
152 Id. at 1200 n.6. 
153 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d)(3). 
154 E.g., Timothy E. Gilsbach, Special Education Due Process Hearing 
Requests under the IDEA: A Hearing Should Not Always Be Required, 2015 
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 187 (2015). 
155 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4). 
156 Id. § 300.508(c). As a general matter, OSEP has opined that “apart from the 
hearing rights set out at § 300.308, decisions regarding the conduct of Part B due 
process hearings are left to the discretion of hearing officers.” Letter to 
Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073, 1075 (OSEP 1995). 
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Second, some state laws provide IHOs with authority for dismissals 
with or without prejudice.157  For example, Georgia authorizes the 
IHO to write a decision for dismissal with prejudice when the party 
with the burden of production does not meet its burden of 
persuasion158 and to issue a dismissal without prejudice upon a 
party’s motion for voluntary dismissal for cause.159   
 
Third, courts have delineated other circumstances, such as a federal 
court decision upholding dismissal with prejudice where the parents 
repeatedly violated the IHO’s hearing orders160 and another federal 
court decision ruling that dismissal with prejudice should be reserved 
for extreme cases, with close calls—especially for pro se parents—
being against this sanction.161 
 
In general, it would appear to be advisable to 1) hold a hearing where 
the basis is a factual matter of material dispute;162 2) limit dismissals 
with prejudice to cases of rather egregious conduct by the filing 
party, whether separately sanctionable or not;163 and 3) issue a 
written opinion with factual findings and legal conclusions sufficient 
to withstand judicial review.164  Finally, for the variation of a 
                                                          
157 E.g., Edward S. ex rel. T.S. v. W. Noble Sch. Corp., 63 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D. 
Ind. 2014); Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 44 IDELR ¶ 166 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding dismissal with prejudice under state law); cf. 
T.W. v. Spencerport Cent. Sch. Dist., 891 F. Supp. 2d 438 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(review officer dismissal with prejudice under state law standards).  
158 E.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 616-1-2.35 (2010). 
159 Id. 160-4-7-.12(3)(m). 
160 Edward S., 63 IDELR ¶ 34. 
161 Nickerson-Reti v. Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Mass. 
2012); cf. Mylo v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cty., 948 F.2d 1282 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(ruling, specific to judicial action, that the sanction for the parent should not 
generally extend to dismissal for the student). 
162 E.g., Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 30 (Pa. SEA 2001). 
163 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Sch., 32 IDELR ¶ 62 (Mich. SEA 
1999). 
164 For examples of IHO decisions that did not meet this sufficiency test, see 
Wehrspann v. Dubuque Cmty Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 33775, adopted, 72 IDELR ¶ 
212 (N.D. Iowa 2018); A.B. v. Clarke Cty. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 259 (M.D. Ga. 
2009).  Of course, even where the decision is sufficiently specific, it is subject to 
being reversed on appeal to court.  E.g., Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline 
Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 93 (D.N.H. 2009). 
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contingent order of dismissal with prejudice, a federal district court 
upheld the authority under an IHO’s equitable powers when state law 
does not expressly prohibit such an order, with the possible abuse of 
discretion based on the circumstances.165 
 
81. Do IHOs have wide discretion with regard in conducting the 
hearing, including determining the scope of evidence? 
 
Yes.166  For example, the weighing of testimony, even in the absence 
of rebuttal or objection, is within the IHO’s authority.167  The 
generally applicable judicial standard of review is abuse of 
discretion, which usually favors the IHO.168  However, the federal 
                                                          
165 Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2014).  In this 
case, the court concluded that the contingent order of dismissal with prejudice was 
not an abuse of discretion where the filing party withdrew her complaint one week 
before the hearing and the IHO allowed thirty days for either refilling or requesting 
recusal.  However, the court recommended that additional findings of facts and 
statements of appeals rights “might have been helpful to all parties.”  Id. at 68. 
166 In the commentary accompanying the IDEA regulations, OSEP’s 
illustrations of IHO’s broad procedural discretion include 1) determining 
appropriate expert witness testimony (Assistance to States for the Education of 
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,691 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300)); 2) 
ruling upon compliance with timelines and the statute of limitations (id. at 46,705-
46,706); 3) determining whether the non-complaining party may raise other issues 
at the hearing not specified in the complaint (id. at 46706); and 4) providing proper 
latitude for pro se parties (id. at 46,699). 
167 McAllister v. District of Columbia, 53 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014). 
168 E.g., O’Toole v. Olathe Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 709 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Price v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 214 (E.D. Pa. 2016); D.Z. 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2 A.3d 712, 721 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); cf. Sch. 
Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928 (E.D. Va. 2010) (upholding time 
limits and extensions favoring parents); Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia, 
535 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2008) (upholding IHO’s exclusion of evidence); 
Renollett v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 42 IDELR ¶ 201 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d on 
other grounds, 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding IHO’s limiting the issues, 
per state law for timely hearings).  But cf. J.C. ex rel. J.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 
66 IDELR ¶ 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); S.W. ex rel. W.W. v. Florham Park Bd. of 
Educ., 70 IDELR ¶ 46 (D.N.J. 2017) (prejudicial exclusion).  For further support of 
the prevailing view, see the commentary accompanying the regulations. 71 Fed. 
Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (“The specific application of those [general 
regulatory] procedures to particular cases generally should be left to the discretion 
of hearing officers who have the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in 
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district court for the District of Columbia has required IHOs to 
provide parents with a flexible opportunity for providing evidence to 
support the remedies of tuition reimbursement and compensatory 
education where the parents prove the requisite entitlement for such 
relief.169  Similarly, courts have provided ample latitude to IHOs in 
maintaining an efficient completion of the case, keeping the parties 
focused on the issues.170 
 
82. Do IHOs have the authority to determine procedural issues that 
the IDEA does not address? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as “such determinations are 
made in a manner that is consistent with a parent’s or a public 
agency's right to a timely due process hearing.”171 
 
83. What are the key factors that IHOs should carefully consider and 
reasonably explain in their credibility determinations? 
 
Although various factors may apply depending on the circumstances, 
they include the extent of the witness’s pertinent experience with the 
child172 and the witness’s relevant expertise.173 
                                                          
accordance with standard legal practice. There is nothing in the Act or these 
regulations that would prohibit a hearing officer from making determinations on 
procedural matters not addressed in the Act so long as such determinations are 
made in a manner that is consistent with a parent’s or a public agency’s right to a 
timely due process hearing”). 
169 A.G. v. District of Columbia, 794 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2011); Gill ex 
rel. W.G. v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2010), further 
proceedings, 770 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011); Henry v. District of Columbia, 
750 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2010). 
170 E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2013). 
171 Letter to Cohen, supra note 22 (citing Assistance to States for the Education 
of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 
71 Fed. Reg. at 46,704). 
172 E.g., Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 
2012); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Michael R. ex rel. Lindsey 
R., 44 IDELR ¶ 36 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007); cf. W. 
Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S. ex rel. M.S., 44 IDELR ¶ 
159 (D.N.J. 2005) (ruling that exclusive reliance on parents’ experts as “utterly 
persuasive” was unsupported in the record and, thus, not entitled to any deference).  
The child’s teachers and other regular service providers merit special attention in 
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84. Do the Federal Rules of Evidence, such as Rule 702 concerning 
the standard for expert witnesses, apply to IDEA impartial hearings? 
 
Not directly, because they apply to federal courts; state courts may 
follow a different standard.174  If state law does not specify the 
applicable procedural rules for IHOs, the Federal Rules would appear 
to provide guidance by analogy within the broad discretion of 
IHOs.175  In general, the IDEA does not require detailed procedures 
and formal rules evidence.176 
                                                          
this regard.   E.g., Heather S. v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Smith, 230 F. Supp. 2d 704, 730 (E.D. Va. 2002).  
However, this factor is not without limits and is partly jurisdictional.  K.S. ex rel. 
P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004–1005 (N.D. Cal. 
2008).  For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the view was that according deference to 
the testimony of school personnel based on the child-experience factor, without 
careful consideration of the parents’ witnesses, would not only create a 
discriminatory standard but also obviate the need for an impartial hearing.  Id.  For 
another example of the non-bright limits, compare the majority and minority (and 
lower court) opinions in the Fourth Circuit’s 2-to-1 decision in County School 
Board of Henrico County v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005).   
173 This overlapping factor often extends to the child’s teachers and other 
district professional personnel, but not exclusively or arbitrarily. E.g., K.S. ex rel. 
P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 
426 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. 
ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinction between medical 
and educational professionals).  
174 E.g., People v. Basler, 710 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that 
Illinois state courts follow the Frye, not Daubert, standard for expert witnesses). 
175 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities 
and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,691.  For a 
more complete analysis, see Perry A. Zirkel, Expert Witnesses in Impartial 
Hearings under the IDEA, 298 EDUC. L. REP. 648 (2014). 
176 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D. 
Conn. 2000): 
Due process does not require formal rules of evidence and procedure. 
Detailed rules of procedure are no panacea against lengthy, 
contentious, wasteful, divisive, or delay-causing arguments. Indeed, 
highly formalized systems of legal procedure can be fodder for delay. 
Due process is not always served by bringing every dispute into a 
mini-courtroom where only lawyers can navigate the myriad rules.  A 
formalized system could serve to disenfranchise and exclude the very 
people meant to be served, namely the parents and the educators.  
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85. May an IHO limit the number of days for the hearing? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as the IHO provides the parties 
with the hearing rights that the regulations prescribe.177  Although 
OSEP has referred to the IHO’s responsibility “to accord each party a 
meaningful opportunity to exercise these rights during the course of 
the hearing,”178 the courts’ aforementioned abuse of discretion 
standard provides ample latitude to the IHO to rule in favor of 
efficiency, particularly in light of the forty-five day regulatory 
deadline.179   More recently, OSEP has opined that a state best-
practice guideline limiting a hearing to three sessions of six hours per 
session does not violate the IDEA just as long as it allows the IHO to 
make an exception. 180 
  
86. Do IHOs have the discretion to determine the consequences of 
not meeting the five-day disclosure deadline? 
 
A literal reading of the regulation would suggest an answer of No. 181  
However, the authority to date supports an answer of Yes, including, 
                                                          
177 Letter to Kerr, 22 IDELR 364 (OSEP 1994).  For the prescribed hearing 
rights, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.512. OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of 
Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2018). 
178 Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995). 
179 E.g., B.S. ex rel. K.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch., 799 F.3d 1217 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (upholding prehearing order of 9 hours per party based on circumstances 
of the case, including state law); T.M. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 233 
(D.D.C. 2014) (viewing limitation on cross-examination as reasonable in the 
context of hearing specified in prehearing order as maximum of four days); A.M. v. 
District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193, 207 (D.D.C. 2013) (viewing the IHO’s 
reduction of repetitive testimony and sua sponte questions in completing hearing in 
one day as efficiency rather than incompetence or bias); cf. L.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Lansing Sch. Dist. 158, 65 IDELR ¶ 225 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. 
Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 938 (E.D. Va. 2010) (upholding IHO’s enforcement 
of time limits set with parties’ agreement). 
180 Letter to Kane, 65 IDELR ¶ 20 (OSEP 2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acc-13-017562r-mn-
kane-dph.pdf. 
181 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(3) (2018) (“Any party to a hearing . . . has the right to . . . 
[p]rohibit the introduction of any evidence . . . that has not been disclosed to that 
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but not limited, to prohibiting the introduction of the evidence or 
allowing the rescheduling of the hearing.182 
 
87. Does the IHO have the authority to allow testimony by telephone 
or television? 
 
According to OSEP, this matter is within the IHO’s discretion, 
subject to judicial review in terms of whether the parties had 
meaningful opportunity to exercise the rights specified in the IDEA 
regulations, including the right to “present evidence and confront, 
cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses.”183    
However, except where the parties jointly agree or where state law  
                                                          
party at least five business days before the hearing.).  But cf. “The [IHO] may bar 
[evaluations not meeting five-day deadline].  Id. § 300.512(b)(2).  
182 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities 
and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 
Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,614 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); 
Letter to Steinke, 18 IDELR 739 (OSEP 1992); see also Pottsgrove Sch. Dist. v. 
D.H., 72 IDELR ¶ 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018); E.P. ex rel. J.P. v. Howard Cty. Pub. Sch. 
Sys., 70 IDELR ¶ 176 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d mem., 727 F. App’x 55 (4th Cir. 2018); 
L.B. v. Kyrene Elementary Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 150 (D. Ariz. 2018);  J.H. ex 
rel. L.H. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 123 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Jason O. 
v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 41, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Avila v. 
Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 64 IDELR ¶ 171 (E.D. Wash. 2014); L.J. ex rel. V.J. v. 
Audubon Bd. of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 37 (D.N.J. 2008); Warton v. New Fairfield Bd. 
of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2002).  There are no “tests” for the IHO to 
follow in making such determinations, but the purpose of the rule is, in OSEP’s 
view, “to allow all parties the opportunity to adequately respond to the impact of 
the evidence presented, and to eliminate the element of surprise as a strategy a 
party may employ to influence the outcome of the hearing decision.”  Letter to 
Steinke, 18 IDELR 739 (OSEP 1992); cf. Letter to Bell, 211 IDELR 166 (OSEP 
1979) (“It is not interpreted to mean that everything that will be used by either 
party must be revealed. It does mean that names of witnesses to be called and the 
general thrush of their testimony should be disclosed”).  In the commentary 
accompanying the most recent IDEA regulations, OSEP added that nothing 
prevents parties from agreeing to a shorter period of time. Assistance to States for 
the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children 
With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 
34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  For a decision in which the failure to follow the five-day rule 
contributed to a judicial remand to re-do the hearing, see B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of 
Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014). 
183 E.g., Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995) (citing 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.512(a)(2)). 
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provides such authority,184 the applicable case law is inconclusive.185  
 
88. Do IHOs have the authority to compel the appearance of witness, 
including those who are not district employees? 
 
According to OSEP, yes.186  
 
89. May an IHO order the LEA to provide the parent with e-mails 
from or to school district personnel? 
 
Presumably this discretion is within the IHO’s subpoena power,187 
even though the e-mails may not be student records under FERPA.188 
 
90. Do IHOs have authority to order the district to provide the parent 
with access to the records of one or more other students as part of an 
impartial hearing? 
 
Not without the consent of the parents of the other students, 
according to the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO), which is 
                                                          
184 E.g., E.D. v. Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 
2003). 
185 Compare Greenwich Bd. of Educ. v. G.M. ex rel. K.M., 66 IDELR ¶ 128 
(D. Conn. 2016) (ruling against such IHO authority), and Genn v. New Haven Bd. 
of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 73 (D. Conn. 2015) (ruling against IHO authority), and 
Walled Lake Consol. Sch. v. Jones ex rel. Thomas, 24 IDELR 738 (E.D.  Mich. 
1996) (ruling against IHO authority), with Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 480 
F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (ruling in favor of such IHO authority), aff’d on 
other grounds, 518 F. 3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); cf. Hampton Sch. Dist. v. 
Dobrowolski, 17 IDELR 518 (D.N.H. 1991) (at the judicial level) (ruling in favor 
of IHO authority where sufficient justification),  
186 Letter to Steinke, 28 IDELR 305 (OSEP 1997). 
187 In addition to any implied subpoena power of IHOs under the IDEA, 
approximately 40 states laws expressly provide IHOs with this power.  Zirkel, 
supra note 5, at 14–16.    
188 Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870 (9th Cir. 
2018); S.A. ex rel. L.A. v. Tulare Cty. Office of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 111 (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (ruling that only those e-mails that not only personally identify the student 
but also are in the student’s permanent file qualify as education records under 
FERPA); see also E.D. ex rel. T.D. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. 
Pa. 2017) (ruling that parent was not entitled to access to e-mails not maintained by 
district). 
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responsible for administering FERPA.  For the hearing in question, 
which concerned a disciplinary record that included identifiable 
information about not only the student with disabilities whose parent 
initiated the hearing but also other students, FPCO provided this 
guidance: 
 
[A] school district should redact the names of, or 
information which would be directly related to, any 
other students mentioned in another student's 
education records before providing a parent access to 
the student's education records.  In instances where 
joint records cannot be easily redacted or the 
information segregated out, the school district may 
satisfy a request for access by informing the parent 
about the contents of the record which relate to his or 
her child.189 
 
Adding support for this answer, a federal district court recently 
upheld an IHO’s refusal to allow the parents, via their expert, to 
access the records of other students.  The court reasoned that even if 
the parents had obtained a court order to compel the district to 
produce redacted copies, the IHO would not have erred in denying 
their request in light of the overriding individualized nature of 
FAPE.190 
 
91. Do IHOs have contempt powers? 
 
No, unless state law provides such authority.191 
 
92. Do IHOs have the authority to issue disciplinary sanctions against 
a party or the party’s attorney for what the IHO regards as hearing 
misconduct? 
 
                                                          
189 Letter to Anonymous, 113 LRP 14615 (FPCO Feb. 13, 2013). 
190 M.A. ex rel. A.A. v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 57 (D.N.J. 
2016). 
191 E.g., E.D. v. Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 
2003). 
    
76 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 38-2 
Again, the answer is a matter of state law, according to OSEP.192  
The published case law is scant and somewhat supportive.193 
 
93. May an IHO dismiss a hearing after multiple postponements? 
 
It depends on state law.  In a Massachusetts case, the court reversed 
such a dismissal where the hearing officer did so after granting the 
latest postponement request, but state law required the hearing officer 
to either 1) deny the motion for postponement or 2) grant it and set a 
new hearing date.194 
 
94. May the school district or its attorney provide the IHO with the 
student’s education records without prior consent of the parent? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP, if the parent filed for the hearing.  
Conversely, according to OSEP, if the district filed for a hearing, the 
school district may do so but only after providing due disclosure to 
the parent and via witnesses, not on an ex parte basis..195 
 
95. Does the IDEA entitle the parent to a choice between a written or 
electronic (e.g., audio-taped) transcript of the hearing? 
                                                          
192 Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997). 
193 E.g., Edward S. ex rel. T.S. v. W. Noble Sch. Corp. 63 IDELR ¶ 34  (N.D. 
Ind. 2014) (upholding IHO’s dismissal with prejudice where parents repeatedly 
violated IHO’s hearing orders); G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint 
Elementary Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 223 (E.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 698 
(9th Cir. 2014) (upholding IHO’s decision to partially award attorneys’ fees of 
$3880 to district for frivolous claim of parent’s attorney); K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. 
Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding 
IHO’s decision to grant sanctions against parent’s attorney); Stancourt v. 
Worthington City Sch. Dist., 841 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that 
IHO has implied powers similar to those of a court but in this case the sanction of 
dismissal with prejudice was too harsh); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 32 
IDELR ¶ 90 (D. Minn. 2000) (upholding IHO’s order for parent’s attorney to pay 
$2,432 as a sanction for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request–based on 
Minnesota statute repealed in 2004.  For a comprehensive analysis, see Salma A. 
Khaleq, The Sanctioning Authority of Hearing Officers in Special Education, 32 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2012). 
194 Philbin ex rel. S.P. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 54 IDELR ¶ 96 (D. 
Mass. 2010). 
195 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996). 
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Yes.  Although the IDEA previously did not offer the parent a 
choice,196 the 1997 amendments revised the language to provide 
parents with “the right to a written, or, at the option of the parents, 
electronic verbatim record of such hearing.”197 The 2004 
amendments have retained this choice-providing language.  
However, the choice is for one or the other, not both. 198 
 
96. Does this right to a transcript extend to prehearing sessions?  
 
No, according to an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, unless 
state law expressly provides otherwise.199 
 
97.  Does this right to a transcript continue after the applicable period 
for filing for judicial review? 
 
Yes, according to OSEP.200 
 
98. Is the parent entitled to a translation of the hearing transcript into 
his or her native language? 
 
Not in the absence of a state law according to a Pennsylvania 
appellate court in a gifted education case.201 
 
99. Does the failure to provide the parent with the complete transcript 
or recording amount to a denial of FAPE? 
 
                                                          
196 E.g., Edward B. v. Paul, 814 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1987). 
197 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(3) (2017).  
Thus, the First Circuit’s aforementioned Edward B. decision is no longer good law.  
E.g., Stringer v. St. James Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2006). 
198 Letter to Maldonado, 49 IDELR ¶ 257 (OSEP 2007), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-
3/maldonado091107dueprocess3q2007.pdf. 
199 A.L. v. Jackson Cty. Sch. Bd., 635 F. App’x 774 (11th Cir. 2015). 
200 Letter to Connelly, 49 IDELR ¶ 135 (OSEP 2007), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2007-
3/connelly081507dueprocess3q2007.pdf. 
201 Zhou v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 976 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2009). 
    
78 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 38-2 
It depends on whether the missing testimony is significant in terms of 
affecting the child’s substantive right to FAPE.202 
 
100. May IHOs take official notice of a fact or standard akin to a 
court’s power of judicial notice? 
 
The pertinent case law is insufficient to provide a clear answer where 
state law does not expressly provide this power.203 
 
101. May an IHO admit hearsay evidence? 
 
Generally, yes unless state law dictates otherwise,204 but relying on it 
in the IHO’s decision without corroborative proof may be 
problematic.205 
 
102. May an IHO admit evidence from the period prior to the 
applicable statute of limitations? 
 
Yes.  This determination is within the IHO’s broad discretion,206 
although the results typically only are usable as background 
information.207 
                                                          
202 E.g., Kingsmore v. District of Columbia, 466 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 130 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 
203 E.g., J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting challenge to non-use in connection with applicable state law); Ross v. 
Framingham Sch. Comm., 44 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1999), aff’d mem., 229 
F.3d 1133 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting challenge to use but not addressing this issue 
squarely); cf. Brandon H. v. Kennewick Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (E.D. 
Wash. 2000) (citing Washington law specifying said authority). 
204 E.g., Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia, 535 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 
2008); Sykes v. District of Columbia, 581 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2007); 
Glendale Unified Sch. Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
205 E.g., Speight v. Dep’t of Corrections, 989 A.2d 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) 
(ruling in context of administrative hearings generally, rather than IDEA IHO 
hearings specifically, in Pennsylvania). 
206 E.g., Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 630 F. App’x 917 (11th 
Cir. 2015); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (D. Minn. 
2015); cf. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (listing compliance with the statute 
of limitations as one of the examples of the IHO’s broad discretion).  
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103. Does the “snapshot” rule, or evidentiary standard, apply for 
IHO’s assessment of the appropriateness of IEPs? 
 
It depends on the jurisdiction.  For example, the First, Second, Third, 
and Ninth Circuits have adopted this standard,208 whereas the Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits have partially disagreed.209  This approach 
considers the time of the educational decision, not the adjudicator’s 
deliberations, as controlling to determine appropriateness. 
 
104. On the other hand, what is the “four corners” evidentiary rule in 
relation to FAPE determinations? 
 
This standard, which originates in contract law, exclusively restricts 
consideration to the final version of the IEP that the school system 
offered during the IEP process.210  Various circuits have adopted it 
but typically only in limited circumstances or with exceptions.211  
 
105. May the party that requested the hearing generally raise issues 
not in the complaint? 
 
                                                          
207 E.g., Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 36 (D. Ariz. 2016); 
Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. E.B. ex rel. J.B., 45 IDELR ¶ 249 (D. Haw. 2006). 
208 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); Lessard 
v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2008); Adams 
v. State of Or., 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999); Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd. 
of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993) (Mansmann, J., concurring) 
209 E.g., M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 326—27  
(4th Cir. 2009); O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch.  Unified Sch. Dist., 144 F.3d 692, 
702-03 (10th Cir. 1998). 
210 E.g., C.G. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(explaining but not either adopting or rejecting this standard). 
211 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); D.S. v. 
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2010); Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist., 
538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008); A.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672 
(4th Cir. 2007); Knable v. Bexley City. Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).  For a more recent, state 
appellate court decision, see Jenna R.P. v. City of Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 229, 3 
N.E.3d 921 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013).    
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No,212 unless the other either party agrees213 or—at least in the 
Second Circuit—“open[s] the door” (e.g., via its opening statement 
or via its questioning of witnesses).214   Clarifying that “the waiver 
rule is not to be mechanically applied,” the Second Circuit has 
explained that “[t]he key … is fair notice and preventing parents 
from ‘sandbag[ging] the school district’ by raising claims after the 
expiration of the resolution period.”215 In a subsequent decision, a 
federal district court in New York concluded that the parent had 
provided fair notice of the issue of methodology via a general 
reference in the complaint to the lack of sufficient progress in a 
similar program.216  Reaching a similar result as the Second Circuit’s 
exceptions, the Ninth Circuit found applicable to IDEA hearings the 
federal evidentiary rule that treats issues as raised in the complaint if 
tried by express or implied consent.217 
 
106. May the complaining party raise additional issues specifically 
via a reservation of rights provision in their complaint? 
 
                                                          
212 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Cty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 
1996).  For examples of enforcement of this stricture, see McAllister v. District of 
Columbia, 53 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014); T.G. ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C.  Dep’t of 
Educ., 973 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Saki ex rel. Saki v. Haw. Dep’t of 
Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 103 (D. Haw. 2008). 
213 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B) 
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with 
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(d) (2018).  For application of this general 
requirement to the levels beyond the IHO, see, e.g., R.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Byram 
Hills Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);  
214 M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 250 (2d Cir. 2012); Y.S. v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (via its witnesses and via 
cross examination of the other side’s witnesses).  This exception is narrowly 
limited.  E.g., B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 634 F. App’x 845, 849–50 (2d Cir. 
2015).   
215 A.S. ex rel. Mr. S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 
2014) (citing C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 
2014)). 
216 J.W. ex rel. Jake W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 95 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
217 M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1159, 1196 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
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No, according to a published federal court decision in New York.218 
 
107. May the other (i.e., noncomplaining) party raise issues not in the 
complaint? 
 
The regulations do not address this question, but the accompanying 
commentary takes the position that the answer is a matter of state 
procedures and, in their absence, the IHO’s discretion.219 
 
108. Does an IHO have authority to proceed with the hearing in the 
of a party? 
 
In general, courts review such matters on an abuse of discretion 
standard, which makes it advisable for the IHO to provide and 
document due notice to the non-appearing party and ample 
opportunity for rescheduling participation.  Thus, it would appear to 
be in effect a last resort within the need for a prompt decision.  In 
applying these limited circumstances, courts have upheld the IHO in 
the clear majority of cases. 220   
 
109. May an IHO order the independent evaluation of the child?  If 
so, who is responsible for payment of the evaluator, and are there any 
limits to the cost and qualifications? 
 
The IDEA regulations make clear that if the IHO orders the 
evaluation it is at public expense (i.e., the district is responsible for 
                                                          
218 B.P. v. N.Y.C.  Dep’t of Educ., 841 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
219 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and 
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Cohen, supra note 
22. 
220 Compare J.D. ex rel. Davis v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No. 
2:09-cv-00139, 2009 WL 4730804 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 4, 2009), aff’d mem., 357 F. 
App’x 515 (4th Cir. 2009); A.S. v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 62 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794 
(N.D. Ohio 2009); cf. Doe v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 89 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 2006) 
(upholding dismissal via exhaustion analysis); Cty. of Tolumne v. Special Educ. 
Hearing Office, No. F046485, 2006 WL 165045 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2006), with 
Millay ex rel. YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep't, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D. Me. 2010). 
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payment).221  The courts have recognized that this regulation provides 
the underlying authority for such an order,222 including its use for 
providing an expert assessment for determining a compensatory 
education award per the qualitative approach.223 The cost and 
qualifications limits are those that apply to the district’s use of 
evaluators.224  However, an order for a trial period as the evaluation 
poses other limits,225 and the issue of an IEE at public expense is also 
distinguishable.226 
 
110. Does the school system have the legal right to object to the 
parent’s choice to have the hearing open or closed to the public? 
 
Not according to OSEP.227 
 
                                                          
221 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(d) (2018). 
222 E.g., B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lopez-
Young v. District of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 42 (D.D.C. 2016). 
223 E.g., Luo v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016); 
Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 169 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Manchester-
Essex Reg'l Sch. Dist. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 490 F. Supp. 2d 
49, 54 (D. Mass. 2007).  Indeed, it is reversible error for an IHO not to issue such 
an order in certain circumstances.  E.g., M.Z. ex rel. D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., 521 F. App'x 74, 77 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that the IHO erred by not ordering 
an IEE at public expense upon finding the district’s evaluation to be inappropriate). 
224 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e).  Limitations of an evaluator’s implementation of 
the IHO’s order is a separable issue.  E.g., Luo v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 68 
IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (recognizing a constitutional privacy claim upon 
private psychologist’s access to student’s records in the absence of parental 
consent). 
225 E.g., Manchester-Essex Reg'l Sch. Dist. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. 
Appeals, 490 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (D. Mass. 2007).  Indeed, it is reversible error for 
an IHO not to issue such an order in certain circumstances.   
226 E.g., M.Z., 521 F. App'x at 77 (ruling that the IHO erred by not ordering an 
IEE at public expense upon finding the district’s evaluation to be inappropriate); 
Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 169 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (ruling that 
the regulation authorizing an IHO to order an IEE “‘as part of’ a larger process” 
does not deprive an IHO of jurisdiction of a request for an IEE at public expense).   
227 Letter to Eig, 68 IDELR ¶ 109 (OSEP 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-fg-8-04-
16.pdf. 
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111. What is the outer boundary of a parent’s right in terms of having 
individuals, including members of the press, attend hearing that they 
have chosen to be closed? 
 
According to OSEP, the outer limit is for “individuals who have 
some direct relationship to the parties and/or a personal need to 
understand the conduct of proceedings generally,” thus not extending 
to members of the press.228  OSEP also added the reminder that an 
IHO may “remove any individual in attendance whose behavior is 
disruptive or otherwise interferes with conducting a fair and impartial 
hearing.”229 
 
112. Do school employees, whom the parent has not invited, have the 
right to attend a closed hearing? 
 
No, according to OSEP, unless (1) the parents have provided consent, 
(2) the IDEA regulations authorize their attendance, or they meet the 
FERPA exception for “legitimate educational interests.”230  OSEP 
also emphasized that in such matters, the IHO “is in the best position 
to ensure that the confidentiality of personally identifiable 
information is properly protected and that standard legal practice is 
followed in the due process hearing.”231  
 
113. Is opposing counsel entitled to a copy of an expert’s notes for 
cross-examination if the expert uses the notes on direct examination? 
 
Yes, according to an unpublished decision in New Hampshire, but 
the court relied in part on the state-adopted Federal rules of 
Evidence.232 
 
                                                          
228 Id. 
229 Id. 




232 I.D. ex rel. W.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 17 IDELR 684 (D.N.H. 
1991). 
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114. Does attorney-client privilege apply to lay advocates in 
impartial hearings under the IDEA? 
 
It depends on state law.  For example, a federal magistrate concluded 
that New Jersey law implied an affirmative answer for impartial 
hearings under the IDEA.233 
 
115.  In a compensatory education or tuition reimbursement case, 
does the IHO have the discretionary authority to bifurcate the hearing 
so that the remedial issue is reserved for a second stage depending on 
the outcome of the FAPE issue? 
 
This matter is largely unsettled.  With very limited exception,234 state 
laws do not address this question.  Similarly, the directly applicable 
case law provides qualified but limited support.235  Arguably, this 
procedure, if exercised prudently, fulfills the IDEA purpose of 
efficient hearings.  Moreover, if the parties agree to the procedure 
and cooperate in its prompt completion, its practical utility and legal 
defensibility would seem to be high. 
 
116.  May an IHO (a) rely in part on unsworn statements of a party 
during the prehearing conference and (b) consider sworn testimony 
of the parent showing a bias for parochial schools? 
 
According to a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the 
answers are (a) yes, and (b) maybe.  More specifically, the court 
respectively (a) rejected the application of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence regarding settlement and other such statements, and (b) 
                                                          
233 Woods ex rel. T.W. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51 (D.N.J.  1993). 
234 CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(b) (authorizing IHOs to bifurcate the 
hearing in tuition reimbursement cases); cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:1-14.6(e) 
(providing more general and qualified authority for HO bifurcation of the hearing). 
235 L.J. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 486 F. App’x 967 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding 
the IHO’s bifurcation of the hearing in a tuition reimbursement case based on state 
law as applied to the particular circumstances); Maple Heights City Sch. Dist. v. 
A.C. ex rel. A.W., 68 IDELR ¶ 5 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (concluding that the IHO 
implicitly has bifurcation authority in a compensatory education case and any delay 
affects both parties equally). 
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concluded that this considered preference was relevant to the FAPE 
issue but not the ultimate foundation for the IHO’s decision.236 
 
G.  Decisional Issues 
 
117. What is the role of medical, psychological, and educational 
diagnoses that are not listed in the IDEA classifications for 
eligibility? 
 
Such diagnoses may provide a supplementary role, but they are not 
generally necessary; in cases of conflict in definitions or criteria, the 
IDEA specifications are controlling.237  
 
118. Is the “educational performance” component of the eligibility 
definition limited to the academic, as compared with the social, 
dimension? 
 
The two major appellate decisions are split on this interpretational 
issue.238  
 
119. Are any of the procedural violations of the IDEA a per se denial 
of FAPE? 
 
The only seeming possibility, depending on the interpretation of the 
relevant IDEA language, is where the proof is preponderant that the 
district “[s]ignificantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to 
                                                          
236 Johnson v. Boston Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018).  This question- 
and-answer item overlaps with the Impartiality and Decisional Issues sections of 
this document. 
237 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Role of the DSM in IDEA Case Law, 39 
COMMUNIQUÉ 30 (Jan. 2011).  For illustrative policy interpretations specific to 
dyslexia, see, for example, Letter to Unnerstall, 68 IDELR ¶ 22 (OSEP 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/oseplettertounnerstall4-
25-16dyslexia.pdf; Dear Colleague Letter, 66 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSERS 2015). 
238 Compare C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 322 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 
2009) (academic only), with Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2007) (extends to social dimension). 
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participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of 
a FAPE to the parent’s child.”239  
 
120. Has the Rowley floor-based substantive standard for denial of 




121. What is the prevailing standard for FAPE implementation cases? 
 
Rather than 100% compliance, the leading judicial standards are (1) 
failure to implement a material, i.e., substantial or significant, portion 
of the IEP, and (2) the same material failure plus the lack of 
benefit.241 
 
122. Do an IHO’s minor corrections of the transcript constitute per se 




123. Would the verbatim adoption of all of either party’s proposed 
findings of facts undermine the traditional deference to the IHO’s 
findings and presumption of impartiality? 
 
It certainly could do so.243  
                                                          
239 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) 
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with 
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2018). 
240 In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 
(2017), the Supreme Court held, based on the confined facts and conclusions in 
Rowley, that the substantive standard is whether the IEP “is reasonably calculated 
to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”   
241 Compare Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2007) (materiality alone), with Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 
F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000) (materiality/benefit).  For a detailed analysis, see Perry A. 
Zirkel & Edward T. Bauer, The Third Dimension of FAPE under the IDEA: IEP 
Implementation, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 409 (2016). 
242 E.g., Paschl v. Sch. Bd., 453 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2008) (ruling that IHO’s 
corrections to the transcript were, if error, harmless). 
243 E.g., Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 39 IDELR ¶ 66 (D. Minn. 2004). 
    
Fall 2018       Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers 87 
 
124. Who has the burden of persuasion at the hearing stage? 
 
For FAPE cases, the Supreme Court held that under the IDEA, which 
is silent on this point, the burden of persuasion is on the challenging 
party, i.e., the parent.244  However, some state laws have put the 
burden of proof in such cases on the district.245  Conversely, lower 
courts have extended the Supreme Court’s ruling to other issues, such 
as whether the child is eligible246 and whether the child’s placement 
is in the least restrictive environment (LRE).247 
 
125.  What is the standard, or quantum, of proof at the hearing stage? 
 
Presumably it is the general civil standard of preponderance of the 
evidence, as derived from the judicial review stage.248 
 
126. Does an IHO have authority to grant res judicata or collateral 




127. Does an IHO’s FAPE or placement decision for one academic 
year have a binding effect, via res judicata or collateral estoppel, on 
FAPE or placement for the next academic year? 
                                                          
244 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
245 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1)(c).  The limited exception in New York is for 
the second step in tuition reimbursement cases, which is whether the parent’s 
unilateral placement is appropriate.  Id.  Other state laws put the burden of 
production in FAPE cases on the district without making clear the possible 
distinction from the burden of persuasion.  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55) 
(2018). 
246 Antoine M. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 420 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Pa. 
2006). 
247 L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2006). 
248 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3) (2018). 
249 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d 
Cir. 2005); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 950 F. Supp. 2d 946 
(N.D. Ohio 2013); IDEA Pub. Charter Sch. v. Belton ex rel. C.M., 48 IDELR ¶ 90 
(D.D.C. 2007). 
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No, according to the Ninth Circuit; each school year represents a 
separate issue.250 
 
128. May an IHO remand a case to the district for further action or 
information rather than deciding the case? 
 
No, such action would violate the IDEA’s imperative for a timely 
final decision.251 
 
H.  Written Decisions 
 
129. Does the IHO have the discretion to restate the issue(s) of the 
case? 
 
Yes, within reasonable limits, based on the IHO’s consideration of 
the parties’ arguments.252 
 
130. May IHOs comment in the written decision about attorney 
conduct at the hearing? 
 
OSEP has indirectly addressed this issue by opining that a state law 
that expressly allows such comments is not contrary to the IDEA 
provided that the comment is 1) linked to a relevant issue (e.g., a 
                                                          
250 T.G. ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baldwin Park Unified Sch. Dist., 443 F. App’x 
273, 276 (9th Cir. 2011). 
251 E.g., Muth ex rel. Muth v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 124–25 
(3d Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
252 E.g., M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014); J.W. v. 
Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Ford v. Long Beach 
Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 58 
IDELR ¶ 132 (N.D. Cal. 2012); K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 54 
IDELR ¶ 215 (D. Minn. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 747 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 
2011); W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 
2009); cf. Adam Wayne D. v. Beechwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 52 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (implicit notice to defendant-district); Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003) (impartiality challenge); Renollett v. Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 11, 42 IDELR ¶ 201 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 440 
F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (limiting the issues).  But cf. M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. 
Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 852 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2017) (questioning wisdom 
of IHO reframing issues where the complainant has legal representation). 
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complaint perceived to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation) and 2) does not preclude a party’s ability to address such 
comments in court or in any application for attorneys’ 
fees.253 
 
131. Do the IHO’s legal findings need support in the record? 
 
Yes; without such support, a court may conclude that the findings 
were arbitrary and capricious.254  Conversely, where the IHO’s legal 
findings are supported in the record, courts generally afford them 
notable deference.255  In general, the deference increases where the 
IHO’s factual findings are careful and thorough.256  Moreover, given 
                                                          
253 Letter to Zimberlin, supra note 104. 
254 E.g., J.G. ex rel. Jimenez v. Baldwin Park Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 
3d 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2015); M.O. v. District of Columbia, 20 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 
2013); S.G. v. District of Columbia, 498 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D.D.C. 2007); cf. Haw. 
Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L. ex rel. Rita L., 64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (remand 
for failure to explain credibility findings); J.M. ex rel. L.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (where extensive attention to facts not 
directly related to the core issue of the case and contradictory findings on this 
issue); R.C. ex rel. X.C. v. Great Meadows Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 61 
(D.N.J. 2013) (in the absence of an evidentiary hearing); Stanton v. District of 
Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2010) (failure to include sufficient 
findings and reasoning for calculation of compensatory education); Options Pub. 
Charter Sch. v. Howe, 512 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2007) (entire lack of factual 
findings nullified IHO’s decision).  But cf. J.P. v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 254 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (credibility-based determinations need not be detailed in light of the 
forty-five-day deadline); see also B.E.L. v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 63 F. 
Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Haw. 2014); S.A. v. Weast, 898 F. Supp. 2d 869 (D. Md. 2012). 
255 E.g., Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 2010); D.B. ex 
rel. Brinson v. Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 86 (4th Cir. 2000); Doyle v. 
Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); cf. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist. 
v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995) (credibility-based factual findings).  
However, the Seventh Circuit has made an ambiguous distinction between the 
“evidence” and IHO’s “decision.”  Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th 
Cir. 1995). 
256 E.g., Pointe Educ. Serv. v. A.T., 610 F. App’x 702 (9th Cir. 2015); J.W. v. 
Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Cerra v. Pawling Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Wartenburg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995); Doyle v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 
100 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 
1991); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2010).  
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has counted the IHO’s participation in the 
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the grey area of mixed questions of fact and law, the boundary 
between factual findings and legal conclusions under the IDEA does 
not amount to a bright line.  For example, in the Fourth Circuit at 
least, the appropriateness of an IEP is a question of fact.257  
 
132. Does the IHO have to limit the factual findings in the written 
decision to those essential for the legal conclusions? 
 
Although it may be appropriate practice, as a matter of efficiency, to 
do so, there is no such legal requirement; i.e., it is not reversible error 
to include additional facts.258 
 
133. Do IHOs have similar qualified discretion with regard to their 
legal conclusions? 
 
Yes.  For example, writing shortcuts, such as cutting and pasting a 
selected group of conclusions from another decision, are not legal 
error if well founded.259  Conversely, however, an IHO’s legal 
conclusion that fails to reference the supporting facts may not receive 
judicial deference.260  For example, a federal court vacated and 
remanded a hearing officer’s decision that “lack[ed] sufficiently 
detailed reasoning” (which in this case overlapped with insufficiently 
explained fact-finding).261 
                                                          
questioning of witnesses as part, although not necessarily the controlling part, of 
the “thorough and careful” calculus for according deference.  R.B. v. Napa Valley 
Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007); Park v. Anaheim High Sch. 
Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006).  Conversely, a court exhibited 
disappointment and aversion to a case where the hearing officer adopted verbatim 
the 480 factual findings and 79 legal conclusions proposed by one of the parties.  
B.H. ex rel. T.H. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 66 (E.D.N.C. 2015).  
257 E.g., G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2003). 
258 E.g., B.E.L. v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Haw. 
2014). 
259 Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 249 
(E.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 391 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 
260 E.g., Marc M. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. 
Haw. 2011). 
261 M.O. v. District of Columbia, 20 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2013); see also 
T.S. v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 69 IDELR ¶ 95 (E.D. Mich. 2017); J.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (unduly short analysis of the case 
issues). 
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134. Is it appropriate for an IHO to use the term “mental retardation” 
in a written decision referring to a child with this classification? 
 
No.  On October 5, 2010, the President Obama signed legislation that 
changes the use of “mental retardation” in the IDEA and other 
federal legislation and regulations to “intellectual disability.”262    
 
135. Do IHO remedial orders need to have a specific evidentiary 
foundation? 
 
Yes, but the reversals on this basis are relatively infrequent and more 
a matter of the underlying substance than the quality of the writing.263 
 
136. Are IHOs allowed to amend their decisions for technical errors?  
 
Yes, to the extent that OSEP leaves the matter to the discretion of 
SEAs and IHOs, provided that both parties receive proper notice.264  
Such corrections may be either sua sponte or, when it does not 
change the substance or outcome of the decision, at the request of 
either party.265      
 
137. Must IHOs redact their written decisions to avoid information 
that is not personally identifiable to the student(s)? 
 
                                                          
262 Rosa’s Law, 124 STAT. 2643 (2010). 
263 E.g., Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 139 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 
(viewing IHO’s denial of compensatory education as not entitled to deference due 
to lack of explanation and justification); L.O. v. E. Allen Cty. Sch. Corp., 58 F. 
Supp. 3d 882 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (invalidating various IHO orders in the absence of 
sufficient factual foundation or legal violations); District of Columbia v. Pearson, 
923 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling that any FAPE-related remedial relief 
requires not only ruling that district denied FAPE but also reasonably specific 
evidentiary basis); cf. Cupertino Union Sch. Dist. v. K.A., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1088 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (vacating and remanding IHO compensatory education award for 
lack of evidentiary support). 
264 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the 
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 
12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).  
265 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-25. 
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This issue is reserved to state law and policy, but OSEP has clarified 
that the SEA is ultimately responsible for redacting, before public 
dissemination of the decision, “any personal characteristics or other 
information that would make it possible to identify the student who is 
the subject of the written decision with reasonable certainty or make 
the student’s identity easily traceable.”266  This redaction does not 
extend to the IHO’s name, the district’s name, or the case number 
unless it would result in personally identifiable information to the 
student(s).267 
 
I.  Miscellaneous 
 
138. Does a noncustodial parent have standing to file for a due 
process hearing? 
 
Yes, according to the Seventh Circuit, unless (a) unless the divorce 
decree expressly eliminates all rights in educational matters or (b) the 
custodial parent’s exercise of the decreed rights trumps this right.268  
 
139. What is the standard of judicial review for an IHO’s decision? 
 
The lower courts have varied in their interpretation and application of 
the Supreme Court’s “due weight”269 standard.270  However, the 
                                                          
266 Letter to Anderson, 48 IDELR ¶ 105 (OSEP 2006), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2006-
4/anderson101306confident4q2006.pdf. 
267 Letter to Anonymous, 67 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSEP 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/16-000584-
iepdevelopmentandimplementation-acc.pdf. 
268 Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2001), after 
remand, 49 F. App’x 69 (7th Cir. 2003). 
269 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
206 (1982). 
270 See generally Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy Skidmore, Judicial Appeal of Due 
Process Rulings, 29 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 22 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Judicial Appeals of Hearing/Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA, 78 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 375 (2012); James Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis 
of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469 
(1999); cf. Perry A. Zirkel, The Standard of Review Applicable to Pennsylvania’s 
Special Education Appeals Panel, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 871 (1994) (proposing the 
analogous standard for IDEA review officers).   
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general theme is to provide (1) presumptive deference to the IHO’s 
factual findings, particularly for the credibility of witnesses, and (2) 
de novo review for the IHO’s legal conclusions.271  The deference for 
factual findings tends to be less for those that are based on additional 
evidence272 and more for those that are careful and thorough.273   
 
Overall, the party challenging an IHO’s decision faces a steep “uphill 
climb.”274 
 
140. Does an IHO have authority to confer consent decree status on a 
settlement agreement? 
 
The likely answer is “in limited circumstances,” although the case 
law is not sufficiently on point for a more definitive answer.  More 
specifically, the court decisions concerning whether the parent is 
entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party of a consent decree 
are indirectly applicable and have varying limits.275 
 
141. May lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings? 
 
                                                          
271 E.g., Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 
2004); Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Doyle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1991). 
272 E.g., Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 
603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004). 
273 E.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.  Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit recently clarified that this deference does not apply for a lengthy IHO 
decision that failed to address all the issues and evidence.  M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. 
Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2017). 
274 E.g., James S. ex rel. J.S. v. Town of Lincoln, 59 IDELR ¶ 191 (D.R.I. 
2012).  For an empirical analysis that shows the high correlation in outcomes upon 
judicial review, see Zirkel & Skidmore, Judicial Appeal of Due Process Rulings, 
supra note 270.   
275 E.g., Justin R. v. Matayoshi, 561 F. App’x 619, 620 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 
626-31 (4th Cir. 2010); Maria C. ex rel. Camacho v. Sch. Dist., 142 F. App’x 78, 
81–82 (3d Cir. 2005); V.G. v. Auburn Enlarged Cent. Sch. Dist., 349 F. App’x 582, 
584 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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It depends primarily on state law.   During the most recent survey, 10 
states prohibited their representation, and 12 permitted it.276  In other 
states, the decision is within the  IHO’s discretion, with some IHOs 
not allowing it as the unauthorized practice of law.277 
 
142. When lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings, 
are their communications privileged at subsequent judicial 
proceedings to the same extent as under the attorney-client privilege? 
 
Yes, according to a published federal magistrate’s decision in New 
Jersey.278  
 
143. May an IHO reconsider a decision upon the request of either 
party or both parties? 
 
Only if (1) the state’s applicable procedures allow it, and (2) the 
reconsideration is before the final decision and is issued within the 
forty-five-day, or properly extended timeline.279 
 
144. May an IHO clarify the decision upon the request of either or 
both parties? 
 
Only if the state procedures allow it and within a limited time.280 
                                                          
276 Perry A. Zirkel, Lay Advocates and Parent Experts under the IDEA, 217 
EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21 (2007). 
277 Id. at 22–24.  But cf. Kay Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons: 
Construction of the IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEORGETOWN 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193 (2002) (criticizing the Delaware decision, which 
ruled that the lay advocate who represented the parents had engaged in 
unauthorized practice of law). 
278 Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.N.J. 1993).  The 
court did not definitively rule on the related question of work-product protection, 
although seeming to lean in the same direction for that answer.  Id. 
279 C.C. v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 109 (E.D. Tex. 2015); 
Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-25; Letter to Colleye, 111 
LRP 45430 (OSEP Oct. 20, 2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2010-
4/colleye102010dph4q2010.pdf; Letter to Weiner, 57 IDELR ¶ 79 (OSEP 2011).  
For the similar but separable issue of whether the state may clarify the IHO’s order 
via CRP, see Gumm ex rel. Gumm v. Nev.  Dep’t of Educ., 113 P.3d 853, 858 
(Nev. 2005). 
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145. Does an IHO have the authority to retain jurisdiction sua 
sponte? 
 
No, according to the limited case law due to the finality requirement 
for IHO decisions.281 
 
146. Do parents have the right to place under seal the transcript and 
exhibits of an open due process hearing for which the redacted IHO 
decision is available on the SEA website? 
 
Yes, according to an unpublished decision in Ohio, in which the 
court relied on FERPA and the child’s right to privacy.282 
 
147. Does the IDEA permit interlocutory appeals of IHO prehearing 
orders or interim rulings (e.g., partial dismissal) to court? 
 
No, according to various courts.283 
 
148. In a tuition reimbursement case, does the IDEA require payment 
during the stay-put period? 
 
                                                          
280 E.g., T.G. ex rel. T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931–32 
(C.D. Ill. 2012); see also Assistance to States for the Education of Children With 
Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with 
Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. pt. 300).  For a review officer decision that vacated an IHO’s clarified 
decision as not meeting these criteria, see In re Student with a Disability, No. 17-
021, 117 LRP 25324 (N.Y. SEA May 22, 2017). 
281 E.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. ex rel. J.D., 948 F. Supp. 860, 889–
90 (D. Minn. 1995). 
282 Oakstone Cmty. Sch. v. Williams, 58 IDELR ¶ 256 (S.D. Ohio 2012), rev’d 
on other grounds, 615 F. App’x 284 (6th Cir. 2015). 
283 J.G. ex rel. Greenberg v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 728 F. App’x 764, 765 (9th 
Cir. 2018); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1088–90 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Hopewell Valley Reg’l Bd. of Educ. v. J.R. ex rel. S.R., 67 IDELR ¶ 202 (D.N.J. 
2016); I.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 674, 688 
(E.D. Pa. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014).  Stay-
put is a possible exception.  E.g., Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 582 F.3d 576, 
592 (5th Cir. 2009).    
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Not necessarily, according to OSEP.  It is a state law matter, subject 
to IHO and court interpretation.284  However, various courts have 
interpreted stay-put to apply to an IHO’s—or, in a two-tier state, a 
review officer’s—decision that orders tuition reimbursement.285 
 
149. May a school district delay implementing an IHO’s remedial 
order in favor of the parent prior to expiration of the period for 
appeal? 
 
It depends, according to OSEP.  The threshold criteria are whether (1) 
state law allows it, and (2) the state’s appeal period is reasonable.286  
However, the ultimate criterion is what is a “reasonable period of 
time” in the particular case, which is a factual matter based on 
various factors that include the timing of the district’s appeal and the 
nature of the IHO-ordered relief.287   
 
150. Do IHOs have authority to enter a contingent final order? 
 
Yes, in limited circumstances, according to a federal district court 
case.288  As the second step of its analysis, the court concluded that 
the IHO did not abuse her discretion in conditionally dismissing the 
parent’s case with prejudice if she did not file a new complaint within 
thirty days.289 
 
151. Do IHOs have a constitutional right to a hearing upon their 
termination? 
 
                                                          
284 Letter to Philpot, 60 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/11-007614r-tx-philpot-
txrules-11-7-2012.pdf. 
285 E.g., Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d 
1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009); Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290 
F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 2002); St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 
776, 789–91 (5th Cir. 1998); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. ex rel. Heidi S., 96 
F.3d 78, 83–85 (3d Cir. 1996). 
286 Letter to Anonymous, 29 IDELR 179 (OSEP 1993). 
287 Letter to Voigt, supra note 96. 
288 Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2014). 
289 Id.   
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No, according to the limited case law authority where the IHO 
received notice of the findings and an opportunity to reply in writing 
under the applicable state law.290 
 
152. Is an IHO’s prehearing order appealable to court? 
 
No, according to the Ninth Circuit.291  The court reasoned that the 
principles underlying the "final judgment rule"—the promotion of 
judicial efficiency and the avoidance of multiple lawsuits—also 
applied to reviews of IHO decisions under the IDEA.292 
 
153. Do the two specifically authorized IHO remedies for 
disciplinary changes in placement at 34 C.F.R. § 300.432(b)(2) 
preclude additional or alternative remedies in such cases? 
 
No, according to OSEP.293  In some of these expedited cases, OSEP 
offered compensatory education as an example of a permissible 
remedy.294 
 
154. Does an IHO have authority to order a district to comply with a 
violated procedural requirement even if the violation does not 
amount to a denial of FAPE?  
 
Yes, just as long the order is limited to ordering prospective 
procedural compliance.295  
 
155. To resolve the issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel, may a 
SEA assign a case to the same IHO who adjudicated a prior case with 
the same parties? 
 
                                                          
290 Tyk v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 796 N.Y.S.2d 405, 428–29 (App. Div. 
2005). 
291 M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d at 1088–90. 
292 Id. 
293 Letter to Zirkel, 119 LRP 19543 (OSEP May 13, 2019). 
294 Id. 
295 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) 
(2017).  See, e.g., Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 
63 (N.D. Tex. 2014). 
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Yes, according to OSEP.296 
 
156. Must the SEA make IHO decisions available to the public?  If 
so, for how long? 
 
Yes.297 OSEP has added that this availability should be FERPA-
required redaction.298  The agency clarified that the required  
redaction includes information that (a) would make the student 
identifiable with reasonable certainty, or (b) would “make the 
student’s identity easily traceable if disclosed to the school’s 
community or the community at large.”299 
 
For the period, OSEP stated: “We view [a] five and a half year[] time 
period as the most reasonable minimum time period during which 
States must make due process and State-level review findings and 
decisions available to the public under [the IDEA regulations].”300 
 
157. After a parent files a complaint for investigation under the 
SEA’s complaint procedures process, may a district file for a due 
process hearing on the same issue(s) so as to trigger the IDEA 
regulations’ mandatory deferral? 
 
Yes, although OSEP strongly encouraged districts not to do so, 
instead recommending mediation or other informal dispute resolution 
procedures.301  OSEP’s rationale was as follows:  
 
                                                          
296 Letter to McDowell, 213 IDELR 162 (OSEP 1988). 
297 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.513(d)(2), 300.514(c)(2) (2018). 
298 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-27. 
299 Letter to Anonymous, 67 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSEP 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/16-000584-
iepdevelopmentandimplementation-acc.pdf. 
300 Letter to Anonymous, 69 IDELR ¶ 253 (OSEP 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-to-anonymous-2-27-17-
recordretention.pdf. 
301 Dear Colleague Letter, 65 IDELR ¶ 151 (OSEP 2015), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl04152015disputeres
olution2q2015.pdf. 
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Public agencies that seek to force parents who have already 
exercised their right to file a State complaint into a potentially 
more adversarial due process hearing harm the "cooperative 
process" that should be the goal of all stakeholders. 
Moreover, diverting resources into adversarial processes 
between parents and public agencies is contrary to 
Congressional intent in the 2004 amendments to IDEA's 
dispute resolution procedures to give parents and schools 
expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in 
positive and constructive ways.302 
 
158. What should the IHO do if the parents file for a hearing after  
closure of the charter school that their child attended? 
 
First, the answer depends on the status of the charter school under 
state law, with the two primary but not exclusive categories being the 
charter school as a LEA or being part of an LEA.303  If the charter 
school is part of an LEA, the LEA is the proper party (unless state 
law assigns responsibility to another public entity).304  However, if 
the school is an LEA, the SEA would appear to have the ultimate 
obligation in the matter,305 and the IHO’s actions will depend on 
whether the parents file against the SEA as an additional or 
alternative party.306   If not, the IHO faces the difficulty of a charter 
school defendant who may not appear or, upon appearing, may claim 
insolvency.307  
  
159. Do IHOs have the authority to award attorneys’ fees? 
 
                                                          
302 Id. 
303 Frequently Asked Questions about the Rights of Students with Disabilities 
in Public Charter Schools under the IDEA, 69 IDELR ¶ 78 (OSERS 2016), at item 
6. 
304 Id. at items 7 and 49. 
305 Id. at item 9.  See, e.g., Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F. Supp. 
3d 510, 519–20 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
306 E.g., Rodriguez v. Creative Educ. Preparatory Inst., No. DPH 1516-28, 117 
LRP 4367 (N.M. SEA Jan. 12, 2017). 
307 E.g., Mr. B. v. E. Granby Bd. of Educ., 201 F. App’x 834, 837 (2d Cir. 
2006); Mathern v. Campbell Cty. Children’s Ctr., 674 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D. Wyo. 
1987). 
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No.  Neither the IDEA nor any corollary state law provides for this 
authority, although two states require IHOs to designate the 
prevailing party on an issue-by-issue basis.308   In the absence of the 
requisite statutory basis, IHOs lack this authority.309 
 
160.  Is there any case law about the employment security of IHOs? 
 
The case law is limited, and the expectation of continued 
employment varies widely per individual contract arrangements and 
applicable state law.310 
 
                                                          
308 Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (identifying California and Tennessee as the 
only states with this requirement). 
309 E.g., Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. v. C.B., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1319 (S.D. 
Fla. 2018); A.L. v. Jackson Cty. Sch. Bd., 127 So. 3d 758, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013). 
310 E.g., Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577–84 
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting First Amendment, Rehabilitation Act, and state 
whistleblower law claims of IHO whose nonrenewal was based on her blog of 
IDEA advocacy); Tyk v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 796 N.Y.S.2d 406–07 (upholding 
revocation of IHO’s certification based on “misconduct or incompetence,” 
including failing to issue a decision in a timely manner, according to statutory due 
process, which included an opportunity to respond in writing to the notice of 
proposed revocation).   
